PhD. Students of Philosophy of Science Seminar
TUESDAY, 22 MAY 2001
Dept. of Philosophy, University of Genova
via Balbi 4
Genova
PROGRAM
morning room E 

10.00 
Valeria Ascheri (Philosophy of Science) Unification of science 
10.50  Massimiliano Badino
(History and Philosophy of Physics) Philosophical Problems in Statistical Mechanics: the equilibrium case 
11.40  Gabriella Pigozzi
(Logic) Controlled Revision  A new model for belief change 
afternoon room F 

14.30  Paola Cantù
(Philosophy and History of Mathematics and Logic) Mathematics as theory of forms: Hermann and Robert Grassmann 
15.20  Giuseppina Ronzitti(Mathematical Logic) Smaller than 
16.10  Alessandro Dell'Anna
(Epistemology) The language of perception in Austin 
17.00  Mario Valentino Bramè
(Philosophy of Mind) Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysical Revision 
Abstracts
"Philosophical Problems in Statistical Mechanics: the equilibrium case"
In the present discussion foundationals problems about statistical mechanics are presented and we illustrate the three most famous solutions:
Gibbs' and Tolman's pragmatism, Jaynes' subjective approach and ergodic
theory. About this one we briefly present the classical version
(Birkhoff's and von Neumann's theorems) and the Khinchin's "asintotic"
version.
GABRIELLA PIGOZZI
email: pigozzi@andrew.cmu.edu
The study of belief change focuses on the understanding of how an agent should revise his beliefs when he gets new information. The seminal paper in this area is by Alchourrn, Grdenfors and Makinson (AGM) who proposed postulates for belief revision, formulating properties which every revision function must satisfy. AGM, however, do not provide a specific revision algorithm. Moreover, no special attention is paid to the process of iterated revision. I will introduce a new model, called Controlled Revision, where theories are structured and labelled sets of formulas.
Gabbay's Labelled Deductive Systems theory is a good framework for this
model in which realistic features for the revision process can be
implemented, and an appropriate revision algorithm can be defined.
An enquiry into the first definitions of mathematics as "theory of forms" implies an analysis of some related terms, such as quantity, operation, calculus and structure. The works of Hermann and Robert Grassmann are a rich source of information on this subject: Ausdehnungslehre and Formenlehre contribute to the understanding of the algebraic calculus and to the origins of the concept of structure and in addition reveal connections between the mathematical and the philosophical concept of form.
GIUSEPPINA RONZITTI
email: ronzitti@nous.unige.it
"Smaller than"
We define four binary relations "smaller than" on the class of subsets of the Baire space. In ZFC one proves that these definitions are all
equivalent. We consider intuitionistic sets and logic and see that then
they are not. By means of these definitions four intuitionistically not
equivalent notions of countable set are introduced and their properties
studied.
"The language of perception in Austin"
How much is different seeng a rainbow from seeng a colour or a given wave length? Does the definition of the first one presouppose that of the others, and wich kind of definition? The sensedata theory tried from Russell to decompose the observable world and so take account for the reference of a sentence from a subjective point of view. In accordance with some contemporary theory of direct perception, Austin refutes that perspective and discloses some aspects of the common sense ontology.
MARIO VALENTINO BRAMÈ
email: bramario@libero.it
"Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysical Revision"
Is it desirable a metaphysical revision in order to explain some
ontological problems about the philosophy of the mind? Yes, it is. But
the new metaphysics should be weak from an epistemical point of view
and it should lead up to an ontological account.
back to Home Page Epistemologia