The ‘in virtue of’ Relation

EPILOG – Seminar

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11. 12. 2012

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The two-factor argument

Quine's view

- A standard analytic truth like '(x)(x = x)'.
- It depends on language (on the usage of '=')
- But it is also a fact about the world that

'(x) (x = x)'

The two-factor argument

Boghossian's view (1997)

- The following schema catches what consists the truth-value of a statement:
- For any S, S is true iff for some p, S means that p and p.

Disambiguating ‘in virtue of’

- Analyticity: the meaning determines the truth value of the sentences. We can understand the analyticity in two ways (Quine, Boghossian):
- The meaning determines totally the T.V. (Absurd)
- The meaning determines partially the T.V. (Trivial)
- Russell proposes a third way

Disambiguating ‘in virtue of’

- Intuitive grip from arithmetic, the binary multiplication function on **N**:

$$x \times y = z$$

In which way the x-argument determines z?

And the y-argument determines z?

Formal definitions

- Given a function F, we can think F as a Set of n-tuples.
- Ex: binary function on **N** is the Set of all triples of number $\langle x, y, z \rangle \in \mathbf{N}$ in wich the third member is the result of the first two.
- Ex: for the sentences we can use the M-Function that is the set $\langle m, w, v \rangle$.

1) Partial determination

- definition: an argument place i partially determines the result-place n + 1 with respect to a function F just in case there exists a pair of n +1-tuples $\langle x1,...,xi,...xn,y\rangle$,

  $\langle x1,..., xi',... xn' , y'\rangle \in F$

  such that $x1 = x1' , x2 = x2' , ...xi \neq xi' , ...xn = xn'$ and $y \neq y'$.

1) Partial determination

The meaning partially determines the T. V.

〈the proposition that snow is white, wa , T 〉

〈the proposition that snow is black, wa, F〉

But also the state of the world

〈the proposition that snow is white, wa , T 〉

〈the proposition that snow is white, wb, F〉

2) Conjoint determination

- definition: a subsequence of argument places, ⟨i, . . . , k⟩, conjointly determines the value of a function F just in case there is no pair of n-tuples ⟨x1,. . .,xi,. . .,xk,. . .xn,y⟩,

  ⟨x1′ ...,xi′ ,...,xk′ , ...,xn′ ,y′ ⟩ ∈ F such that ⟨xi,...,xk⟩=⟨xi’, . . . , x k’ ⟩ but y ≠ y ′

3) Full determination

- definition: the arguments xi . . . xk in argument positions i . . . k fully determine the result y with respect to a function F just in case for all n + 1-tuples in F, if the values in positions i . . . k are xi . . .xk, then the last member of the n + 1-tuple is y.

4) Rendundant determination

- definition: an argument xi in an n + 1- tuple ⟨x1, . . . xi, . . . xn, y⟩ redundantly determines the result y with respect to a function F just in case (i) the argument place i par- tially determines the result-position of F, but (ii) there is no n + 1- tuple⟨x1′ ,. . .xi′ ,. . .xn′ ,y′ ⟩ ∈ F such that⟨x1 = x1′ ,x2 = x2′ . . .xi ≠ xi′ . . .xn = xn′ and y ≠ y′ .

In defense of Analyticity

- Now with these definitions we can try to defense the analytic-synthetic distinction.
- In a **synthetic** sentence the truth-value is fully-determined by neither argument.
- In an **analytic** sentence the truth-value is fully-determined by the meaning of the sentence.

Collapse into necessity?

- Analytic sentences = necessary truths

Collapse into necessity?

- Analytic sentences = necessary truths

  That's a dangerous consequence!

- Sentences expressing substantive necessities
- Contingent analycities

How analyticity ’t collapse into

- Th s not re
- W

How analyticity doesn't collapse into necessity?

- The *meaning* in *true in virtue of meaning* is *not* referring to the content, but to something else.
- What is it?

Thanks for your attention

Bibliography

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