

CESAP II - PROGRAM

Each speaker will be given 30 minutes plus 15 minutes for discussions.
Place of the sessions: Rector's council room in the main University building.

28th Monday:

9 - 9.45: Ayhan Sol (Ankara University): "A philosophical analysis of the concept of geological law"
9.45 - 10.30: Luc Faucher (Rutgers University): "Evolutionary Psychology and Interfield Theories"
10.30 - 11.15: David Grünberg (Ankara University): "Truth as a Function of, but not Identical to, Justification"
11.15 - 12: Bozidar Kante (Maribor University): "Artworks: Process or Product?"
15 - 15.45: Ferenc Huoránszky (Budapest University): "On Dualism"
14.45 - 16.30: Olga Markic (Ljubljana University): "Downward Causation: Emergentism/Nonreductive Physicalism"
16.30 - 17.15: Gergely Ambrus (Miskolc University): "An Argument Against Conceivability"

Drink in a downtown pub before dinner

29th Tuesday:

9 - 9.45: Augustin Vicente (Barcelona University): "The Exclusion Argument for Physicalism"
9.45 - 10.30: Vojislav Bozickovic (Belgrade University): "Does Familiarity Breed Content?"
10.30 - 11.15: Danilo Suster (Maribor University): "Exportation, Importation and Modus Ponens"
11.15 - 12: András Máté (Budapest University): "Bolzano and Existential Import"
15 - 15.45: Masan Bogdanovski (Belgrade University): "Religious Epistemology and Epistemic Duties"
15.45 - 16.30: Nenad Miscevic (Maribor University): to be announced
16.30 - 17.15: Zivan Lazovic (Belgrade University): "Cartesian Scepticism"

30th Wednesday:

9 - 9.45: Bojan Borstner (Maribor University): "On Russell and Armstrong about Collection of Qualities (problems of universals)"
9.45 - 10.30: Márta Ujvári (Budapest University of Economics): "Events as Tropes and Tropes of Substances"

CESAP II - ABSTRACTS

Ayhan SOL
Middle East Technical University, Ankara
asol@metu.edu.tr

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF GEOLOGIC LAW

In this paper, I claim that, in order to defend the idea of geologic law against the classical model defining laws as unrestricted true universal statements, the condition of unrestricted scope must be rejected, for the attempts to expand the scope of generalizations by eliminating reference to particular places and times in geologic generalizations or by connecting them deductively to higher level theories fail. As for the former, if the scope of a generalization is expanded its truth may not be maintained; as for the latter, on the other hand, even the most general physical laws, that are supposed to ensure the lawlikeness of restricted generalization, do not satisfy the condition of unrestricted scope. Therefore a different model of laws according to which laws are not isolated statements but are rather the coherent parts of established systems is proposed. I discuss this issue on two geological examples which are expected to support the proposed model.

Agustn Vicente
Universidad de Barcelona
avicente@trivium.gh.ub.es

The Exclusion Argument for Physicalism

The exclusion argument for (mental) physicalism tries to prove physicalism by means of three very plausible claims: (i) that the physical world is causally closed, (ii) that mental events have physical effects and (iii) that duplication of causes must be kept at a minimum. Some philosophers think this argument is definitive, but I will try to show that the escape for the antiphysicist is not really expensive. It is open for her to maintain that mental events have effects that are not necessarily physical, thus denying premise (ii) of the argument. As I will explain, this response, the dual explanandum strategy, must be put under severe restrictions, but still it will be available. I take this to mean not that physicalism is false, but that the argument from exclusion is not the argument for physicalism. This conclusion is reinforced by a simple look at naturalistic theories of the mental: Most of these theories, the most promising at least, construe mental properties as teleological, thus having them causally inefficacious. So if one is to argue for physicalism, it should be done on some other grounds. I propose our explanatory needs and the role of unification as explanation as one better candidate.

Boidar Kante

University of Maribor
bozidar.kante@guest.arnes.si

Artworks: Process or Product?

According to Horgan there are certain statements which display the following set of characteristics: (i) they mention, and quantify over, would-be entities that should not be allowed within the correct naturalistic ontology; (ii) they are unproblematically true; and yet (iii) they cannot suitably be paraphrased into a more austere idiom that avoids reference to the would-be entities in question. Here are some examples of statements that putatively exhibit all three characteristics:

- (a) Beethoven's fifth symphony has four movements.
- (b) The University of Maribor is a public institution.
- (c) Chomsky's Syntactic Structures is an influential book.

Horgan believes that the right ontology (sufficiently sparse and sufficiently naturalistic) will not contain neither such things as symphonies (as abstract, multiply instantiable, musical works of art as distinct from concrete entities like performance-events) neither would-be entity like Syntactic Structures supposed to be a single entity over and above the many objects we call "copies of Syntactic Structures" neither various kinds of socially constructed entities like universities.

One fundamental claim of his contextual semantics is: although truth is specifiable in terms of language/word correspondence, often our language functions in such a way that the relevant kind of correspondence is indirect rather than direct, that is, sentences like (a)-(c) are all correctly assertible even if there are no actual entities in the world answering to the terms "Beethoven's fifth symphony", "University of Maribor", or "Syntactic Structures". The truth of the statement (a) above does not require that there be some "dedicated object" answering to the term "Beethoven's fifth symphony". To the contrary, the relevant language/world correspondence relation is less direct than this. Especially appropriate is the behavior by Beethoven that we would call "composing his fifth symphony". But we need to take into account also a wider range of goings-on: in particular, Beethoven's earlier behavior in virtue of which his later behavior counts as composing his fifth symphony and also a broad range of human practices in virtue of which such behavior by Beethoven counts as "composing a symphony" in the first place.

Our objections go along two directions: (1) is the process ontology really a right kind of ontology for artworks (symphonies, novels) and, more important, is this kind of ontology compatible with Parmenidian approach to ontology? The process ontology would maintain that the work is the intentionally guided generative process whereby author specifies a particular structure in a given context. But which features of the overall provenance of this structure are constitutive of the artwork? Why it would be epistemologically easier to individuate and identify "Beethoven's composing of fifth symphony" than "Beethoven's fifth symphony"? If we say we know the symphony itself via those concrete things we call "performances of Beethoven's fifth symphony" we simply push, according to Horgan, the epistemologically problem back a step. After all, we can offer another attempt to specify what are musical works. A musical work is a type, that is capable of being created, is

individuated by context, and incorporates specific means of production. Musical works are "indicated structures" because they come into existence only through intentional action. (2) What is the causal role of such an event as "Beethoven's composing of fifth symphony" if we keep in mind its inaccessibility to us?

Vojislav Bozickovic
University of Belgrade
ipiyu@eunet.yu

Does Familiarity Breed Content?

It is argued that the inferential account of propositional content advocated by Brandom fails when it comes to genuine de re contents as they need to be specified in representational terms which inferentialism seeks to avoid.

Danilo uster
University of Maribor
danilo.suster@guest.arnes.si

Exportation, Importation and Modus Ponens

It is commonly accepted that those embedded conditionals of the type "if A, then if B, then C" we do understand, we understand as equivalent to sentences without embedded conditionals. This reduction is in classical logic achieved with the use of laws of exportation and importation. Van McGee presents counterexamples to modus ponens which are based on the classical treatment of embedded conditionals and proposes to trade the validity of modus ponens for the validity of laws of importation and exportation. It is argued that for a large class of indicative conditionals the laws of exportation and importation are invalid. With the help of Stalnaker's selection function theory of conditionals and the distinction between valid and reasonable inferences it is shown that modus ponens is valid but can be unreasonable, whereas laws of importation and exportation are invalid, but still reasonable. In theorizing about conditionals I distinguish between the conservative and the revisionistic strategy. I interpret McGee's counterexamples as a suggestion to be revisionistic about modus ponens and conservative about the reduction thesis. But rather than jeopardize modus ponens via accepting the reduction thesis, one should really be conservative about modus ponens and revisionistic about the reduction thesis.

Luc Faucher and Pierre Poirier
Rutgers University and University of California-Davis
lucfaucher@hotmail.com

Evolutionary Psychology and Interfield Theories

Evolutionary psychology (EP) presupposes relations between theories of different domains that the two traditional models - reduction and autonomy - cannot properly account for. In this talk, we intend to construct a model of relations between theories that would succeed where traditional models fail. In order to do that, we first show that the multiple realizability argument, on which the autonomist model is thought to rest, is compatible with reductionism and, following Kim, that an autonomist reading of the argument deprives psychology of its scientific status. For this reason, we opt for a reductionist model compatible with functionalism and multiple realizability, but show that, within EP at least, the very application of the conditions of reduction requires strong interactions between psychology and various other adjacent disciplines. We also show that reduction must be preceded in EP by an "augmentation" of the reduction base, which brings yet other disciplines into play. Finally, we present a model of the interaction between disciplines that account best for these relations and discuss the problems facing it.

* * *

David Grnberg
Middle East Technical University, Ankara
david@metu.edu.tr

TRUTH AS A FUNCTION OF, BUT NOT IDENTICAL TO, JUSTIFICATION

There is an ongoing debate on whether truth is identical to epistemic justification (justification hereafter) or not. Those who distinguish truth from justification in the sense that it is independent of an agent's justification (where the agent might be an individual, a particular community or humanity as a whole) are usually said to advocate a realist conception of truth. On the other hand, those who--in some way or another--identifies truth with justification are said to espouse an anti-realist view of truth.

The purpose of this paper is first, to defend the view that truth can neither be identical to actual nor to idealized justification, and second, to introduce a characterization of truth which is in between a strict realist one, that goes along with a version of correspondence theory as being totally independent of justification, and an anti-realist verificationist that identifies truth either with actual or idealized justification.

There are some cases that obviously support the realist position. Consider, for example, the statement "There are n stars in the universe" where n is really the number of the stars in the universe. Given the present state of science and technology, we might have a reasonably good estimation of the numbers of stars in the universe, say, m which is pretty close to n . But it is almost impossible to come up with the exact number of the stars. Hence, we might be justified in believing that "There are m stars in the universe", where it is still false. Moreover, it might be that we have no estimation of the stars at all, where the statement "There are n stars in the universe" would still be true. Hence, one would conclude, truths may exist without justification.

The realist conception of truth is captured by the following formula:

's' is true if and only if it is the case that s

For many empirical statements, to determine whether the state of affairs described by statement 's' exists would be even technically possible and therefore the condition of truth would be fully ascertained by the epistemic agent, it would serve not only as a definition of truth but also as a criterion of truth.

However, in most cases this does not work. For example, we may think of scientific laws like $F = ma$, which involve theoretical terms. In such a case the fact that $F = ma$ cannot be ascertained at once. This is even clearer if we consider evaluative statements like "All men have a right to freedom" and "Democracy is the best form of government." From a cognitivist standpoint these have a truth-value. But the facts, which are supposed to make them true, are not empirical facts, hence, in a certain sense undetectable. Therefore, one might conclude that in most important cases the realist conception can, if at all, only serve to explain the meaning of the term "truth" but cannot provide a criterion thereof. It is correct that definition of truth and criterion of truth are separate problems. However, if we can only define but not ascertain truth it will just have a theoretical importance without practical consequences. This I shall call the ascertainability problem.

One motivation for introducing an anti-realist definition of truth is to overcome the ascertainability problem. Now by definition the criteria, which make up a justification theory are to a large extent accessible to the agent. Therefore, if the truth of a statement were identified with the justification thereof, the ascertainability problem would be solved.

However, there are reasons for rejecting an anti-realist conception of truth. One reason is that there are clear cases of justified false beliefs. As a matter of fact history of science is full of such examples, like laws of Aristotle's and Newton's physics.

One might distinguish between (i) anti-realism that identifies truth with actual justification, (ii) anti-realism that identifies truth with idealized justification, and (iii) consensus theory of truth which is an intersubjective version of (ii). Now the second stance is stronger than the first in the sense that if it does not work the first does not either. Since I will try to show that the second is not tenable, I will not go into the first one. On the other hand, the arguments to be advanced throughout the criticism of the second view will also be relevant in evaluating the third one.

Before I elaborate my view on truth I will consider some remarks of H. Putnam on truth. As a matter of fact Putnam himself is generally considered to identify truth with idealized justification. (He used the expression "rational acceptability" instead of justification, and the standard of justification is coherence as usual.) However, at one moment of his thought, he seems to go against the identification: "Truth is expected to be stable or 'convergent'; if both a statement and its negation could be 'justified', even if conditions were as ideal as one could hope to make them, there is no sense in thinking of the statement as having a truth-value." (Reason, Truth and History, p. 56.) This quote does not imply that Putnam accepts ideally justified false beliefs, but it implies nonetheless that he does not strictly identify idealized justification with truth.

The characterization of truth I will be suggesting will retain this basic realist intuition of Putnam, probably in a bit stronger way in the sense that it will make room for ideally justified false beliefs.

Now, the standards of justification are cognitively accessible. Therefore, justification and also justifiability refers to past and present, never to the future. I will attempt to characterize truth in four steps and in such a way that it will be a function of actual justification and idealized justification but not equal to either.

1. A statement is actually justified for an agent at a certain time just in case the usual standards of coherence with the rest of statements belonging to the agent's belief system are satisfied at that time.
2. A statement is ideally justified for an agent at a given time just in case it is justifiable in all possible cognitive alternatives not less preferable than the actual one. Let us call each alternative a possible world. The actual world is one of the possible worlds.
3. We shall call the possible future development of the actual world in any one of the cognitive alternatives a projected future. The projected futures with respect to the continuously moving present up to infinity may converge on a common line of development, or diverge in the sense that such a common line does not exist.
4. On the basis of the foregoing considerations I propose to define the truth of a statement at present time, if it belongs to an agent's system of statements describing the possible world which includes the line of convergence, if any, of the sequence of projected futures. In case the sequence does not converge upon a common line of development, we say there is no truth at all.

Masan Bogdanovski
University of Belgrade
mbogdan@EUnet.yu
Religious Epistemology and Epistemic Duties

The dominant epistemological tradition originating from Descartes and Locke has tended to identify warrant (what turns true belief into knowledge) with justification. The justification has been construed in terms of epistemic duty and the fulfilment of obligation. Thus the dominant epistemological tradition has been inclined to assume that there is an epistemic duty not to believe in God unless one has proper propositional evidence for the existence of God. Consequently, religious epistemology has given major attention to the arguments for and against religious belief. By showing that there are convincing reasons to doubt in the existence of the epistemic duties depicted above, I attempt to trace the alternative paths religious epistemology should take.

Olga Markic
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
olga.markic@guest.arnes.si

Downward Causation: Emergentism /nonreductive physicalism

In this paper I discuss emergentism and nonreductive physicalism, two rival positions that both maintain our common-sense belief that mental

properties have causal powers. I first explore six main features of traditional emergentism and stress that according to this theory mental properties are irreducible emergent properties with the causal power of their own, which leads to downward causation. On the other side, nonreductive physicalism also takes mental properties as irreducible but doesn't accept genuine downward causation. I argue that because of the causal exclusion argument nonreductive physicalism is an unstable position that leads either to reductive physicalism or to emergentism. I suggest that if there is no way to reduce mental properties we have to accept downward causation and the fact that the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain does not hold.

Mrta Ujvri
Budapest University of Economy
marta.ujvari@phil.bke.hu

Events as Tropes and Tropes of Substances

The view that events are tropes goes back to well-known historical antecedents such as Locke's 'modes' and Leibniz' 'individual accidents'. As understood currently, tropes are individuals but they need not be accidental. For example, the bundle-of-tropes view of substance requires essential tropes to constitute the individual nature of substance. According to the standard view put forward by Keith Campbell, tropes are individual property instances or abstract particulars. However, recently Peter Simon has characterised tropes as 'concrete dependent particulars'. In my view the concreteness of tropes is not tenable for various reasons; I shall elaborate this.

Now given that tropes play a role with substances and also that events are tropes, a series of questions suggest itself. What account of substance is the best companion, to ensure coherence, to the trope account of events? Is there a fit between, say, the bundle-of-tropes view of substance and the trope view of events? Or, perhaps, an unanalysed notion of substance fares better with events? The ambiguous ontological status of tropes manifests itself differently with substances and events: substance theories try to reduce the insubstantiality of tropes while event theories can cope with it.

I have two tenets here. One is to show that the trope account is sound, despite all the problems in the details. Its merit is salient against the background of pure universalist and pure particularist alternatives. The other tenet is to point out that indeterminacy in the modal status of tropes remains unresolved on the trope accounts. More precisely, the modal indeterminacy of the tropes of substance could be resolved, as Simon's theory shows, only at the price of postulating a static distribution of essential and contingent tropes between the hard core and the outer fringe.

Nenad Miscevic
University of Maribor
nenad.miscevic@uni-mb.si

Title: To be announced later

Andrs Mt
Etvös Loránd University of Sciences
mate@ludens.elte.hu

Bolzano and Existential Import

Abstract: To be submitted later.

Ferenc Huoranszky
Etvös Loránd University of Sciences
huoransz@ceu.hu
On Dualism

Abstract: To be submitted later.

Gergely Ambrus
University of Miskolc, Hungary
gambrus@hotmail.com

An Argument Against Conceivability

Abstract: To be submitted later.

Zivan Lazovic
zlazovic@f.bg.ac.yu

Cartesian Scepticism

In this paper, Cartesian scepticism is interpreted on the background of 'justified true belief' conception of knowledge and realistic assumption about the independent existence of the external world. Contrary to nowadays widespread view which holds that Cartesian scepticism stems from the principle of epistemic closure, the author defends the thesis that the source of Cartesian scepticism is to be found in Descartes epistemological internalism, i.e., in his requirement that a person S, in order to know any statement p, has to know that all conditions necessary for her knowledge that p are satisfied. Sceptical alternatives incompatible with S knowledge are divided into T-alternatives, which are incompatible with the truth of p and directly related to the closure principle, and J-alternatives, which are incompatible only with the justifiedness of S belief that p. The author argues that the real strength of Cartesian scepticism lies in its sticking to J-alternatives rather than to T-alternatives.

Bojan Borstner
University of Maribor
e-mail:

On Russell and Armstrong about collection of qualities (problems of universals)

Are things really nothing than bundles (collections) of qualities?

Armstrong "Universals and Scientific Realism, I", 98-99:

"Let there be a particular, a, which, among its properties, has P, Q and lacks R. b has Q, R and lacks P. c has P, R and lacks Q. Let it also be nomically impossible that any particular have all the properties P, Q, and R. it seems clear that all these four conditions might be jointly satisfied.

Yet Russell cannot allow that they are jointly satisfied. P is compresent with Q, Q with R, and P with R. They form a 'mutual admiration society', a complex of compresence. So they must either constitute a complete complex of compresence or a mere complex of compresence. But the fourth condition entails that there is no such complex."

What is a problem here? As first, Armstrong - as it seems on the first sight - overlooks what is going on in Russell's case. Namely, for Russell it is not true that in the case, where P is (temporally) compresent with Q, Q with R, and P with R it would entail that they form such a complex of compresence, i. E. that all three are temporally compresent.. For Russell a complex of compresence is a complex unity. When there is such a complex there is also a relevant fact composed of the elements of the complex in the relation. In this case it would be P, Q, and R being compresent together y standing in a three-term compresence relation.

Armstrong has made a simple mistake, because he misread Russell who said: "There is a relation, which I call 'compresence', which holds between two or more qualities when one person experiences them simultaneously. ... We can form groups of qualities having the following two properties: (a) all members of the group are compresent." (Russell 1976, 297)

Armstrong has offered a solution which has been proposed by Russell even fifty years before in *The Analysis of Matter* and it seems that Armstrong (and Goodman as well) just did not read Russell (enough). Armstrong said, " a chess-board ... must have spatial parts of certain nature related in a certain way. These parts, however, are particulars ... Yet the notion of a particular is the one to be analyzed."

Armstrong has based his attack on the notion of the "part". He thought that in the case where we do expect that a particular is just a bundle of qualities it is not allowed to have particulars, which are composed of parts (which are themselves particulars). However, the case that some (spatial) particulars will have (spatial) parts that are particulars does not mean that a particular cannot be construed as a complex of qualities.