
EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

NEWSLETTER N° 18

The bulletin is issued thrice per year by the end of February, June, and November. If you wish to let us know about activities you or your department are planning (conferences, seminars, workshops, and the like) or about important philosophical events that have recently taken place, please contact either your national correspondent or the newsletter editor, Alberto Voltolini <albertov@zeus.vc.unipmn.it>. Please note ESAP's website:

<http://www.dif.unige.it/esap/>

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α **ECAP 4 - Lund University, Sweden, 14-18 June, 2002 (Call for papers)**

Fourth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, ECAP 4, Lund University, Sweden, 14-18 June, 2002.

Plenary speakers:

Manuel Garcia Carpintero, University of Barcelona

Susan Haack, University of Miami

Timothy Williamson, University of Oxford

Sections and chairpersons:

1. History of Philosophy, Jaakko Hintikka
2. Logic and Philosophy of Language, Pascal Engel
3. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Nancy Cartwright
4. Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind, Martine Nida-R melin
5. Practical Philosophy, Philippe Mongin

Invited speakers:

Nancy Cartwright, London School of Economics (section 3)
Sten Ebbesen, University of Copenhagen (section 1)
Pascal Engel, University of Paris IV- Sorbonne (section 2)
Philippa Foot, University of California, Los Angeles and University of Oxford (section 5)
Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University (section 1)
Diego Marconi, University of Eastern Piedmont (section 2)
Philippe Mongin, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique & cole Polytechnique, Paris (section 5)
Martine Nida-R melin, University of Fribourg (section 4)
Peter Simons, University of Leeds (section 4)
Wolfgang Spohn, University of Konstanz (section 3)

Submission of abstracts:

Authors are invited to submit abstracts of papers that they wish to present at the congress. Each presentation will be given 40 minutes, including time for discussion.

Abstracts should be printed on one page with single line-space, 12 points font size and must not exceed 2500 characters (including spaces). The abstract page should include the name of the author, the title of the paper and the name of the section in which the author wishes to present it. It is desirable that the abstract provides an outline of the arguments given in the paper, and not just the theses argued for.

The abstract should be sent in duplicate to ECAP 4 (address below), by fax (number below) or electronically in PDF-format as an attachment to ECAP4@fil.lu.se.

Authors will be notified by the end of February 2002 about the programme committee's decision regarding their presentations.

Participants of the congress are also invited to a dinner that is planned to take place June the 16th. Reservations are made in the registration form.

Deadline for submission of abstracts: **1 December, 2001.**

Registration:

Registration should be made by **1 April, 2002.**

Please use the enclosed registration form or go to <http://www.dif.unige.it/esap/ecap4.htm>

Workshops:

Congress participants are welcome to attend three special workshops that are being planned in connection with the congress:

1. Philosophy of Law, organized by Aleksander Peczenik (Aleksander.Peczenik@jur.lu.se),
2. Economics and Philosophy, organized by John Broome (John.Broome@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk) and Marc Fleurbaey (Marc.Fleurbaey@univ-pau.fr), and
3. Truth, organized by Sten Lindström (Sten.Lindstrom@philos.umu.se) and Krister Segerberg (Krister.Segerberg@filosofi.uu.se).

Programme Committee of ECAP 4:

Wlodek Rabinowicz (Chair), Joao Branquinho, Josep Corbi, George Meggle, Nenad Miscevic, Kevin Mulligan, Elisabeth Pacherie, Carlo Penco, Howard Robinson, and Stelios Virvidakis.

Contact:

For updates on the congress, suggestions for accommodation and further information please visit the web page:

<http://www.dif.unige.it/esap/ecap4>.

All inquiries, registrations and abstract submissions should be sent to:
ECAP 4, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Kungshuset, SE-222 22 Lund, Sweden.
Fax: +46-46-222 44 24.
Email: ECAP4@fil.lu.se

ECAP-congresses are organized every three years by the European Society for Analytic Philosophy, ESAP. The Society organizes these congresses to further contacts and collaboration amongst European analytic philosophers.

PAST EVENTS

□ **II BARCELONA WORKSHOP ON ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF REFERENCE**
Special topic: TWO-DIMENTIONALISM

The Second Barcelona Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Reference was held in Barcelona on June 28-30, 2001. This second edition of the Barcelona Workshop was devoted to the discussion of the two-dimensional semantic framework. The workshop was organised by LOGOS -- Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group.

Participants

There were 3 invited talks and 15 contributed papers (plus one alternate paper). Invited talks sessions were 2 hours long (1 hour presentation + 1 hour discussion), submitted papers sessions were 1 hour long (30-40 minutes presentation + 30-20 min. discussion).

The invited speakers were David Chalmers (University of Arizona), Mike Martin (University College London) and Robert Stalnaker (MIT). At the end of this report there is a list of all the speakers together with a short abstract of the paper they presented.

The call for papers was very successful as 36 authors submitted papers (5 from the UK, 16 from continental Europe, 12 from North America, 3 from Asia and Australia). The selection process was, then, highly competitive. Submissions were anonymously refereed. The members of the scientific committee were: David Chalmers (Univ. Arizona), Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (Univ. Barcelona), Josep Maci (Univ. Barcelona), Genevieve Mart (London School of Economics), Mike Martin (University College London) and Robert Stalnaker (MIT).

The Barcelona Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Reference

The Barcelona Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Reference is held every other year. The first workshop was held in the spring of 1999. The speakers at that first Workshop were: David Kaplan (UCLA), Joseph Almog (UCLA), Filip Buekens (Tilburg Univ.), Miguel Hernando (MIT), Diego Marconi (Univ. Torino), Genevieve Mart (Univ. of London), Xavier van Mechelen (U. of Leuven), Mathias Paul (WWU Münster), Jorge Rodríguez Marquese (Univ. of Oviedo), Francesco Recanati (CREA) and Alberto Voltolini (Univ. Piemonte Orientale, Vercelli).

This first Barcelona Workshop on Reference had a general character. The II Barcelona Workshop had as special topic two-dimensionality. Future editions of the Workshop will maintain this year's format and each of them will focus on some particular topic in the theory of reference.

Publication

A selection of the papers from the II Barcelona Workshop on Reference will be published in a volume of the European Review of Philosophy (<http://csli-publications.stanford.edu/site/EURO.html>). The ERP is published by the CSLI.

Sponsors

The following institutions provided financial support for the II Barcelona Workshop: *Ministry of Science and Technology* --Spanish Government, *Department of Universities, Research and Society of Information* --Catalan Government, University of Barcelona, *Council for the City of Knowledge* --Barcelona City Hall.

The II Barcelona Workshop was part of the events of the Forum Barcelona'2004.

Two-dimensionalism

The two-dimensional semantic framework has its roots in Saul Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* (1972, 1980); it is developed in such works as David Kaplan's "Demonstratives" (1989), Robert Stalnaker's "Assertion" (1978) and Martin Davies & I.L. Humberstone's "Two notions of necessity" (1980). Some applications of the framework are found, for instance, in David Chalmers' *The Conscious Mind* (1996) and Frank Jackson's *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (1998).

The truth value of a sentence depends on how the world is like in two different ways. Consider, for instance, the sentence "There is a white gorilla in the Barcelona zoo". The truth of this sentence depends, on the one hand, on facts about the world regarding the colour of the gorillas in the Barcelona zoo. The sentence is actually true, but had not been any white gorilla in the Barcelona zoo the sentence would have been false. On the other hand, the truth of the sentence also depends on facts about the world regarding how certain sounds or marks on a paper are used. The sentence under consideration is true, but if the world had been such that the string "gorilla" was used by our community to refer to tigers (while all the other expressions in the sentence were used in the same way as we actually use them) then the sentence would have been false.

We could make analogous considerations regarding the extension of any other kind of expression. For instance, what a singular term refers to depends on how the world is like in two different ways. What the referent of "the tallest mountain in Europe" is depends, on the one hand, on facts about the mountains in Europe; on the other hand it also depends, though, on facts regarding how the expressions that appear in this definite description are used.

We might say that in considering the first kind of dependence of the extension on how the world is like we are considering the possible worlds as counterfactual. In considering the second kind of way in which the extension of an expression depends on the facts we are considering the worlds as actual.

Two-dimensional semantics offers us a framework within which to study the interaction between these two ways in which the extension of an expression depends on the facts. It promises to provide us with insight into the relation between semantic value and cognitive significance. That should allow us, for instance, to have a better understanding the examples provided by Kripke of sentences that express a necessary proposition but are only known a posteriori, and of sentences that express contingent propositions but can be known a priori.

A number of papers presented in the II Barcelona Workshop on Reference (including those of Stalnaker and Chalmers) were concerned with foundational issues regarding the two-dimensional framework. Other papers presented applications of the framework to different problems in philosophy of language, semantics, epistemology and philosophy of mind.

Speakers and abstracts of the talks

Here is a list of the speakers and a short abstract of the work they presented:

DAVID J. CHALMERS

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"The foundations of two-dimensional semantics"

The central importance of the two-dimensional semantic framework is that it promises to yield notions of meaning and possibility that are closely tied to reason and cognition. But many different versions of the

two-dimensional framework have been put forward, and it is not clear how these are related. In this paper, I try to shed light on this matter by distinguishing from first principles different ways of interpreting the framework. The central distinction is between contextual interpretations, which use the framework to model context-dependence, and epistemic interpretations, which use the framework to model epistemic dependence. Contextual interpretations are more common, but I argue that only an epistemic interpretation can yield constitutive connections among reason, meaning, and possibility.

I develop an epistemic version of the two-dimensional framework in some detail, compare it to other versions, and show how it can be used to address a number of important problems in the philosophy of language and mind.

MICHAEL MARTIN

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"Objects of Desire"

Discussions of indexicality and the psychological phenomenon of perspective commonly divorce treatments of this aspect of thought from truth-conditions. Stalnaker's diagonal proposition offers a means of respecting the distinctive features of indexicality within a truth-conditional approach and Higginbotham in recent work has exploited a similar model to explain the nature of tensed thought. In this paper I argue that there are some aspects of the perspectival nature of attitudes towards time which require us to acknowledge that there are subpropositional psychological states. Reflecting on Arthur Prior's famous example of 'Thank Goodness that's over', I argue that we need to recognise a distinction between desires for acts or events and desires for propositions. The former occupy a cycle of motivation in a way that the latter cannot. We can explain the psychological difference here by reference to a difference in the content of desires once we acknowledge that act and event desires in contrast to propositional desires are related to subpropositional objects which do not specify a time.

ROBERT STALNAKER

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"Conceptual and Metaphysical Necessity"

Saul Kripke made a persuasive case that there are necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths, but philosophers have disagreed about the significance of the phenomena that he drew to our attention. Frank Jackson and David Chalmers have argued that there are no *irreducible* necessary a posteriori truths, and have used a two-dimensional modal semantic framework to make precise a way of explaining all necessity in terms of conceptual necessity. But I argue that while the two-dimensional framework gives a useful representation of the phenomena, their reductive account does not succeed. I contrast two interpretations of the framework, one modeled on David Kaplan's semantics for demonstratives and the other - the metasemantic interpretation - in which the second dimension represents the way that the contents of thoughts and expressions depend on the facts. I argue that the first interpretation requires implausible assumptions about the nature of intentionality to explain the facts. The second interpretation, I argue, gives a better account of the phenomena, an account that neither requires nor provides any explanation for a notion of purely conceptual truth that is knowable a priori.

PAUL BLOOMFIELD

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"Let's Be Realistic About Serious Metaphysics"

The main thesis is that "serious metaphysics" (Jackson's term) ought to be focusing only on possibilities which are centered on or indexed to the actual world and ought to ignore possibilities not fixed by what is actually possible. Thus, conceptual analysis performed upon "primary" or "A" meanings, when used as a means to gain a priori knowledge of reality, leads metaphysics astray. Locke's distinction between real and nominal essence is compared to the primary/A - secondary/C distinction between meanings and a dilemma is presented for the defenders of using logically possible zombies as informing our understanding of actual consciousness. The discussion focuses on the work of Locke, Putnam, Kripke, Chalmers and Jackson.

EMMA BORG

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"Demonstrative content and character in semantics and epistemology"

This paper explores how to incorporate the kind of two-aspect theory of meaning for demonstratives familiar from Kaplan within the kind of truth-conditional semantic theory familiar from Davidson. The options for accommodating the elements of the theory of direct reference range from pre- (or meta-) semantics, semantics itself, through to post-semantics (or pragmatics); Kaplan himself endorses the middle road. I argue that this position is clearly correct for character (following arguments concerning complex demonstratives) and thus explore how to accommodate it within a truth-conditional semantic theory. The status of content is, however, claimed to be less clearly semantic: specifically, I argue that, were we to embrace any epistemically-laden (e.g. acquaintance-based) approach to content, it would properly belong to the post-semantic realm. The argument here turns on the nature of deferred demonstratives — expressions which demand referential semantic analysis but flout any suitable epistemic condition. Instead, then, we need to recognise a far thinner notion of content (as Kaplan himself clearly did), one which recognises that the contents of our thoughts may be sensitive to the syntactic forms we use to express them. Only if singular content is understood in this thin way, do we have something which can be treated as properly semantic.

RICHARD BREHENY

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"Anaphoric pronouns and context sets"

This paper concerns itself with non-dynamic approaches to discourses like in (1), focussing on the anaphoric dependence between the pronoun and the indefinite.

- (1) a. Last night I met a member of the Cabinet. He was pro-Europe.
b. I predicted that a woman will be nominated for president. Also, I predict she will win.

The question it poses is whether, in analysing such discourses, Stalnaker's descriptive framework employing sets of possibilities for context and content offers any distinct advantages over frameworks in which the content of utterances and what is presupposed can be represented by other means. It could be suggested that Stalnaker's framework would have the edge if a semantic analysis of pronouns according to which they are treated as variables terms of direct reference could be sustained. After considering the pragmatics of such discourses in somewhat more detail than in Stalnaker (1998), it will be argued that a treatment of pronouns as definite (as in E-type approaches) would in fact be required. As other frameworks can deal with such discourses using an E-type approach, the conclusion will be that Stalnaker's framework does not offer any advantage.

ALEX BYRNE & JAMES PRYOR

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"Bad Intentions"

According to two-dimensionalists like David Chalmers, words like "water" and "Bob Dylan" have two sorts of intensions, a "primary" or "epistemic" intension and a "secondary" or "metaphysical" intension. The "epistemic" intension of a word does the most theoretical work, and can be thought of as a set of properties that all competent speakers associate with the word, that fixes the word's reference, and that accounts for the word's cognitive significance. However, it is *prima facie* unlikely that words have such epistemic intensions. We rehearse Kripke's familiar arguments from ignorance and error, which seem to show that competent speakers need not associate any informative and uniquely identifying properties with their words. We then examine and criticize some of Chalmers' responses to these arguments.

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"Occurrences Revisited"

In this paper, I deal with the issue of the sort of entities that constitute the primary bearers of reference and truth-conditions where indexicals and indexical-sentences are concerned. I side with Kaplan, against utterance accounts, in thinking that they are combinations of syntactical expressions and contexts, or what he has called occurrences. The view I defend differs from other occurrence theories in two crucial respects: it incorporates the completers of demonstratives as one of the parameters against which they obtain a referent, and the resulting linguistic meaning of a demonstrative cannot be represented as a unary function from contexts to truth-conditional contribution. By introducing the completers of demonstratives into the context, the view defended is empirically adequate in ways in which other occurrence theories are not.

Of the three arguments presented by occurrence-theorists against utterance views, namely, those dealing with the lack of expressions problem, the logic problem and the non-uttering problem, I argue that the responses that an occurrence theory should give of them are not always the standard ones. On the non-uttering problem, I argue that there is no situation in which I am not uttering anything is true, and that occurrence-theorists are committed to saying this given the way in which contexts are construed from speech situations. On the lack of expressions problem, I take the standard line from occurrence-theorists, but the line I take on the logic problem is neither standard nor simple. I argue that although we may not have any pressing need from the tasks of logic itself to account for inferences of the form *p therefore p*, where *p* is an indexical sentence, reasonings of a similar form do occur in natural language. I defend this claim by developing the idea of semantic possibility, and argue that a *semantic* theory of indexicals that allows for accounts of why such forms of reasoning are valid are preferable over others like utterance-style theories which, as a matter of principle, cannot. In this way, I seek to respond to the dilemma set forth by Garca-Carpintero to occurrence theories, viz. to either give an empirically adequate account of demonstratives or be faced with the logic problem. The view here defended is empirically adequate in the way required by the dilemma and although it may respond to the logic problem as stated by Kaplan, I argue that the challenge to theories of indexicals does not come from tasks set forth by logic but by semantics.

ROBIN JESHION

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"Descriptive

Descriptive

Names"

Descriptive names are names whose reference is fixed exclusively with the use of a definite description. Acquaintance plays no role. Analysis of descriptive names is typically subordinated to and constrained by the analyses of the semantics and psycho-semantics of ordinary names. This basic attitude is rooted in two widely shared views about descriptive names. One is that descriptive names are extremely rare in natural language. The other is that we are always free to introduce a descriptive name just by stipulating "Let 'N' refer to the F". Gareth Evans relied upon these two points in developing his influential analyses of descriptive names as abbreviations for rigidified descriptions. In this essay, I criticize his theory, and, more importantly, attempt to show that the basic attitude about descriptive names is misguided. Descriptive names should not automatically be taken as having a lesser status in theorizing than ordinary, ostensive names, for they are not particularly rare and cannot be "artificially" created. I use this criticism as a springboard for presenting an alternative semantics and psycho-semantics of descriptive names, one which forces us to alter our understanding of de re thought.

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"Indexical Execution"

According to a standard account of indexicals, the meaning of an indexical type can be displayed by a rule indicating how the designations of its tokens are fixed in terms of facts about their utterances. So viewed, the context-sensitivity of indexicals is partly a matter of token-reflexivity or utterance-reflexivity. But while such reflexivity is essential to interpreting indexical tokens, it is not a factor in a speaker's identificatory use of indexicals. Tokens cannot be interpreted unless they are first produced, and obviously, the speaker who produces them does not depend upon utterance parameters in order to identify their referents. Thus, the standard account cannot explain a speaker's execution of indexical reference. Instead, we must acknowledge a fundamental duality of meaning for every indexical type, executive and interpretative, each of which operates on contextual elements to reduce the individuating modes needed for identification. But whereas contexts of utterance are suitable for interpretation, executive identification depends upon psychological contexts constituted by speakers' perspectives. The notion of perspective is explained, and an analysis of individuating executive mechanisms is given that preserves the threefold distinction between meaning, mode, and referent, and the functional representation of indexical meaning.

PHILIPP KELLER

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"n-Dimensionalism"

Whether or not you can conceive that *p* depends on your epistemic situation. Your epistemic situation

depends on the world you are in. This much is uncontroversial. More important is that a complete description of your epistemic situation also includes what you *know* or even what you *are in a position to know* about the world you are in. Not all of this knowledge can be stripped off while determining truth or falsity of this-worldly statements in counterfactual circumstances. This undermines a distinction between *considering a possible world as counterfactual* and *considering a possible world as actual* in terms of what you keep fixed (only the language or your concepts or empirical knowledge as well) and the associated distinction between primary and secondary intensions. To "retain the concept of the *real actual world*", I will argue, we have to make assumptions about how the real world is like. These assumptions trivialize what we can find out about what is a priori in this way. Conditionalizing on these assumptions paves the way to a more general outlook on the a priori: *n*-dimensionalism.

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"The World According to Pierre"

What we call the *egocentric view* of belief attribution is the idea that, roughly, the success of such attributions is dependent on certain *conditions of fit* between the ways the attributer and the subject of the attribution conceptualise the things and properties the attributed belief is about. One of the traits which make the egocentric view attractive is that it provides an explanation of the troubles we face when we try to attribute beliefs to people who conceptualise the relevant things or properties in a way which differs largely from our own. Kripke's Pierre is an example of this kind.

Egocentric views of belief attribution might be formulated in different theoretical frameworks. In the talk we compare two possible egocentric theories: one formulated in terms of structured propositions and one formulated in the framework of Stalnaker's two-dimensional theory of communication. Using the Pierre case as an example we discuss the explanations the two egocentric theories provide for the troubles which arise if we try to attribute beliefs to Pierre. We argue that Stalnaker's theory provides the most natural framework for the egocentric view.

MICHAELIS MICHAEL

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"The Problems of Double Indexing accounts of The A priori"

Some have sought to domesticate the notion of the a priori by finding a model of it in the more readily accepted space of alethic modality, a model which crucially uses double indexing. In these attempts it is usual to identify the set of a priori interpreted sentences with the set of sentences with a necessary diagonal. These attempts have yielded at best partial accounts. What is common to these accounts is a failure to build in the epistemic aspect of the a priori. But the a priori is essentially epistemic. The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori does not partition the set of truths of an interpreted language, even relative to a speaker and a context. Rather that distinction partitions the set of knowable truths. If there are truths which are unknowable then those truths are neither a priori nor a posteriori knowable. Yet if there are mathematical truths of this sort they will have necessary diagonals and yet not be a priori because they are unknowable.

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"Phenomenal

Concepts"

After a brief introduction of the distinction between phenomenal and non-phenomenal belief with respect to qualia proposed in earlier papers (see e.g. my "On Belief about experiences. (...) " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1997) I use the two-dimensional framework to account for the difference in content between phenomenal and non-phenomenal belief in a way based on ideas of David Chalmers (see David Chalmers, "Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief", accessible in the internet). Phenomenal belief with respect to the quale blue (that can be had only by people acquainted with that quale) involves what Chalmers calls the purely phenomenal concept of blue. The two-dimensional function that characterizes the purely phenomenal concept of blue associates this specific quale independently of the world taken as actual and independently of the world taken as counterfactual (the concept is thus what one might call a superrigid designator). By contrast, the two-dimensional function corresponding to the relational concept of blue involved in nonphenomenal belief about the quale blue (which can be had by someone who is not acquainted with that quale) is either dependent on the world

taken as actual or non-rigid. The description of the subjective content of phenomenal and non-phenomenal belief content proposed (content according to primary intensions) may be used to give a precise account of the intuitive idea that the fact expressed by "A has an experience of blue" can be grasped only by someone who is acquainted with blue: The subjective content of the phenomenal belief that A has an experience of blue (but not of the corresponding non-phenomenal belief) can be represented by the set of possible worlds that also represents the content (according to secondary intensions) of the sentence "A has an experience of blue".

J ROME PELLETIER

Universit de Bretagne Occidentale, France

"Two-dimensionalism, Simulation and Fiction"

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In this paper, I study unofficial uses of the first person pronoun such as in (1) If I were you, I would stay away from me. I distinguish between the official content and the unofficial content of (1). Contrary to the official content of (1) which is located at the level of words, its unofficial content is a property of utterances of (1) and it violates in the consequent of the conditional the rule that I refers to the speaker. Since the aim of conditionals of the If I were you kind is usually to give practical advises, I then try to give an analysis of the kind of imaginative project involved in advising. It appears that advising supposes an imaginative projection into the other's situation without committing the adviser as to what he or she will do when such a situation arises. On that basis, I compare the merits and limits of two analysis of (1), that is an anaphoric proposal and a pretense theoretic proposal. I try to show that the only adequate explanation of conditional statements prefaced with an If I were you sentence should lead us to make a minor improvement in 2-Dimensionalist theory of the reference of pure indexicals in order to take into account the possibility of context-shift through pretense.

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"Indexical concepts"

Following Strawson, Perry and others, we can think of concepts as mental files in which we store information concerning the reference of the concept. *Indexical concepts* (e.g. demonstrative concepts such as "that man") can be construed as special files whose very existence is contingent upon the existence of certain contextual relations to entities in the environment. The reference of an indexical concept is the entity which stands in the appropriate contextual relation to the thinker in whose thought the concept occurs. The nature of the contextual relation which the reference must satisfy determines the *type* of the concept.

In this paper the notion of an indexical concept will be extended so as to encompass a vast class of fairly ordinary concepts. It will be argued that natural-kind concepts such as the concept of water, and recognitional concepts more generally, are indexical concepts based on a certain type of relation to the reference of the concept.

Like demonstrative concepts, recognitional concepts presuppose some form of acquaintance with the reference, hence the extension of the notion of indexical concept which I have just suggested may seem natural. But what about cases in which the subject is not acquainted with the reference but has merely second-hand knowledge of it? I will argue that, in such cases, the subject possesses a *deferential concept*, and that deferential concepts themselves are indexical. While the indexical concepts talked about so far serve as repository for information gained in perception through various relations of acquaintance with the reference, deferential concepts serve as repository for information gained in communication through *linguistic* relations to the reference.

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"Cognitive Significance and the Diagonal Proposition: A Two-Dimensional Approach to Discourse-Internal Identity"

If occurrences *e* and *e'* of proper names, demonstratives or indexicals are used in a discourse, and understanding the discourse requires participants in it to believe that *e* and *e'* are intended to refer to the same thing, then I will say that there is a *discourse-internal identity* between these occurrences of *e* and *e'*. For instance, suppose A and B are talking. A says, "What can I get you?" and B replies "I'll have a beer." Plausibly, fully understanding this conversation requires listeners to believe that A's "you" and B's

"I" co-refer, hence there is a discourse-internal identity between these occurrences of "you" and "I". Discourse-internal identities are typically grasped, and believed to be grasped, by all attentive participants in a conversation, yet propositions about discourse internal identities are rarely the explicit contents of any utterances in the conversation. This speaks in favor of characterizing them as presuppositions of the conversation. What I propose here is an application of the framework offered in Robert Stalnaker's "Assertion" (1976) that treats propositions about discourse internal identities as part of the evolving context set of presuppositions. I also propose a two-dimensionalist extension of the basic solution to deal with the sorts of discourses in which utterances are best understood as conveying the diagonal proposition of a two-dimensional propositional concept.

JASON STANLEY

University of Michigan, USA

<jasoncs@umich.edu>

"Modality and What is Said"

If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is possible, then what it says could be true. Following natural philosophical usage, it would thus seem clear that in assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is assessing what is said by that occurrence. In this paper, I argue that natural philosophical usage misleads here. In assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is not assessing the modal status of the proposition expressed by that occurrence of the sentence.

KAI-YEE WONG

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

<b388758@mailserv.cuhk.edu.hk>

"Two-Dimensionalism, Context and Reference"

Recently Frank Jackson (*From Metaphysics to Ethics*, OUP 1998), David Chalmers (*The Conscious Mind*, OUP 1996), and Kai-Yee Wong (*Sentence Relativity and The Necessary A Posteriori*, *Philosophical Studies*, 1996) have claimed that two-dimensionalism offers a nice explanation of the possibility of Kripkean *a posteriori* necessary truths, such as Water is H₂O and Hesperus is Phosphorus. This paper argues that this claim is sound only if augmented by a relative construal of the *a priori*. Section one of the paper outlines the basic two-dimensional ideas underlying the kind of explanation offered by Jackson, Chalmers and Wong. Section two presents the two-propositions objection against the two-dimensional explanation. It is argued that such an explanation tends to invoke two different propositions for each case of *a posteriori* necessity, one for the attribution of *a posteriority* and the other for necessity. This leads to the suggestion that the two-dimensional account is incomplete without the relativisation of the *a priori*. Finally remarks are made on the intuitive appeal of the relative construal.

☞ **Uppsala, 23-24 October 2001**

The Swedish Royal Academy of Science awarded this year Rolf Chock price to Professor Saul Kripke, and arranged in this connexion a two day symposium with the following programme:

Dagfinn Føllesdal "Kripke and the new theory of reference ;

Sten Lindström "Kripke and Quine on modalities";

Wlodek Rabinowicz "Kripke's argument for mind-body dualism"

Saul Kripke "Frege's theory of sense and reference: Some exegetical notes".

☞ **Uppsala, 8-10 November 2001**

Workshop on Action, arranged jointly by SCASS (Swedish Collegium of Advanced Study in the Social Sciences) and the Philosophy Department, Uppsala University. Programme:

Erik Carlson (Uppsala) Dynamic inconsistency and performable plans

Wiebe van der Hoek (Utrecht) GOAL: a Goal Oriented Agent Language

J F Harty (Maryland) A logic for action with applications: utilitarianism, group actions and strategies .

J-J Meyer (Utrecht) Towards a true logic of action

Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund) "Pragmatical arguments and the unity of the agent".

Krister Segerberg (Uppsala) "Actions and their logics".
Fred Stoutland (Uppsala) "The belief-desire model".
Raimo Tuomela (Helsinki). "Joint intention and commitment".

α **FROM THE VIENNA CIRCLE TO CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY**

PROJECTO SAPIENS 99 DA SOCIEDADE PORTUGUESA DE FILOSOFIA (S.P.F.)

PROF. NILS-ERIC SAHLIN
Universidade de Lund (SWE)

HE IS NO GOOD FOR MY WORK : ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELATION BETWEEN RAMSEY AND WITTGENSTEIN.

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Quarta-feira, 7 de Novembro de 2001 s 18h
Sala 5.2. (Sala de Mestrados)

PROBABILITY, EVIDENCE AND DECISIONS. LEARNING FROM RAMSEY

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sexta-feira, 9 de Novembro de 2001 s 16h
Anf. III (Edifício Novo)

Apoio da FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia) e
POCTI (comparticipado pelo FEDER)

FUTURE EVENTS

CALL FOR PAPERS

α **5th SIFA International Meeting: Wittgenstein Today**
December 20-22 2001, Bologna (Italy)

50 years after the death of one of the greatest philosophers of our time, there is a widespread need of a critical reflection on both his general conception of the aims of philosophy (in relation to the practice of science and other features of human experience), and the specific aspects of his doctrines. The current revealing perspectives in some areas of analytic philosophy with respect to the naturalisation of intentionality and semantics, the re-discovery of mentalism, the loss of centrality of the reflection on language as the starting point for dealing with (and dissolving) metaphysical, epistemological and ontological problems, are all symptoms of an intellectual climate that is very distant from the doctrines of Wittgenstein, or at least from the current interpretations of his thought. The aim of this conference is to promote a critical reflection on Wittgenstein's legacy in four main areas:

- (a) Philosophy of language
- (b) Logic, epistemology and philosophy of mathematics
- (c) Ethics, anthropology, meta-philosophy
- (d) Philosophy of psychology

AMONG INVITED SPEAKERS:

Marilena Andronico, Angsar Beckermann, Stewart Candlish, Cesare Cozzo, Piergiorgio Donatelli, Alberto Emiliani, Pasquale Frascolla, Hans-Johann Glock, Diego Marconi, Marie McGinn, Kevin Mulligan, Luigi Perissinotto, Davide Sparti, Goeran Sundholm, Alberto Voltolini

LANGUAGES: the languages of the conference are Italian and English.

PAPER SUBMISSION:

The complete paper (WORD, Times 12, 15 pages, double-spaced, max. 40.000 characters, spaces included) should be sent to either the President of SIFA, or to the organisation committee for refereeing by November, 15 2001. The result of the refereeing process will be notified by December, 10 2001. The time for presentation for each paper is 25 minutes and the time for discussion is 15 minutes.

CONFERENCE FEE:

15,000 Italian lire (approx. 7.75 euro) for undergraduates, graduate students and SIFA members; others 25.000 Italian lire (approx. 12.91 euro).

ACCOMODATION: for room reservation please contact Sebastiano Moruzzi (mer0090@iperbole.bologna.it)

ORGANISATION COMMITTEE:

Annalisa Coliva (Coliva@philo.unibo.it)
Sebastiano Moruzzi (mer0090@iperbole.bologna.it)

☞ **12th "Seminario interuniversitario de Filosof a y Ciencia Cognitiva**
Girona (Spain), March 21st-23rd, 2002

Invited Speaker: **Christopher Peacocke** (New York)

The workshop is organised by the "Department de Filologia i Filosofia" (Girona University) in cooperation with the "Ctedra Ferrater Mora" (Girona University) and SEFA ("Sociedad Espa ola de Filosof a Anal tica").

Papers are invited for 45 minutes talks (with an additional 30 minutes discussion). Any topic connected to the philosophical work of Professor Peacocke is acceptable.

The deadline for the receipt of papers (or, alternatively, abstracts of no less than 1000 words) is January, 31st, 2002. The organising committee, in cooperation with SEFA, will decide the accepted contributions before February, 28th, 2002.

Submissions can be sent to any of the members of the organising committee:

Antoni Defez (antoni.defez@udg.es)
Joan Pages (joan.pages@udg.es)
David Pineda (david.pineda@udg.es)
Josep L. Prades (josepll.prades@udg.es)

Departament de Filologia i Filosofia
Facultat de Lletres
Pl. Ferrater Mora
17004 Girona
Spain

☞ **Second Workshop on Formal Topology**
Auditorium S. Margherita, Campo S. Margherita
Venice, April 4-6, 2002

organised by:

the EC Types Working Group
Dipartimento di Matematica Pura e Applicata, Universita' di Padova
Dipartimento di Informatica, Universita' Ca' Foscari, Venezia

This workshop is about a specific approach to formal, or pointfree, topology, which stresses its constructive features. Its historical roots include Brouwer's conception of the continuum, which was expressed in terms of choice sequences. The later analysis and elimination of choice sequences led to connections with locale theory and inductive definitions, as in Martin-Loef's Notes on constructive mathematics. So it aims at a theory of formal spaces, in some way similar to the present impredicative theory of locales, but expressed in a predicative constructive framework such as constructive type theory (Martin-Loef) or constructive set theory (Aczel).

As time passed, the landscape of formal topology has become wider, and its distinctive predicative foundation has given rise to some unexpected mathematical developments (even the right approach to the notion of a 'closed set' needs a conceptually new approach, where 'closed' is not the complement of 'open'). Nowadays it includes a variety of themes and novelties, which are of interest in:

- computer science, because of the methods of definition by induction and recently also by co-induction, the techniques for the extraction of constructive information from a priori non effective arguments and connections with domain theory, implementation problems, etc.;

- logic and foundations, because of the interaction between the foundations of mathematics and the actual development of mathematics, methods from proof theory in the practice of mathematics, sheaf models, the logical nature of topological definitions, etc.;

- mathematics itself, because of the process of constructivization - which often is accompanied by a conceptual simplification - of classical results of topology and of mathematics in general and also the connections with category theory and locale theory, etc..

The first workshop of this series took place in Padova, October 1997. It was widely appreciated for its relaxed and constructive atmosphere, and for an open discussion on various approaches. Hopefully with a similar atmosphere, the aim of the second workshop will be to obtain an up-to-date picture of the foundational and technical issues concerning formal topology, and to clarify the connections with related approaches.

Invited speakers. The list of invited speakers at the moment includes Martin Escardo, Henri Lombardi, Peter Johnstone, Erik Palmgren, Mike Smyth, Steve Vickers.

Tutorials. The workshop will be preceded by one day, 3 April 2002, of tutorials to help those people who are interested but have little or even no knowledge of formal topology. At the moment, Peter Aczel and Giovanni Sambin have volunteered.

Contributed papers. Those who wish to contribute with a half hour talk, should submit a summary of contents (from 1 to 10 pages) to Thierry Coquand, coquand@cs.chalmers.se by 28 February 2002. The program committee will notify acceptance by 15 March 2002.

Proceedings. The proceedings will be published after the workshop, probably, a special issue of some good journal (hence with referees and open also to nonparticipants)

Registration. Registration is free; the form below must be sent to Giovanni Curi, gcuri@math.unipd.it. A convenient accommodation in Venice can be provided only to those participants who register by 30 September 2001. For a low cost accommodation (possibly in a common room), contact Claudia Faggian claudia@math.unipd.it

Grants. We also plan to offer a limited number of grants for students and young researchers covering accommodation and food. Please send a short CV and motivations for participation to Giovanni Sambin sambin@math.unipd.it

Site. Venice needs no presentation. But note that the site of the workshop is out of the main tourist routes, and should allow for an appreciation of the popular and historical aspects of the city. We expect to find convenient accommodations nearby.

Social Program. A trip will be organized for those who remain on Sunday 7 April 2002. An idea is to hire a boat and have lunch in an island of the lagoon. The full social program will be communicated later.

Second announcement. The second announcement will contain information updates and the web address of a page dedicated to the workshop (with details on place, accommodation, tourist information, trip, etc.).

The program committee

Peter Aczel
Thierry Coquand
Per Martin-Loef (chair)
Giovanni Sambin (local organization)
Dieter Spreen

□ **I INTER-UNIVERSITY WORKSHOP ON MIND, ART AND MORALITY**
Murcia (Spain), May 20th-22th, 2002.

Invited Speaker: Richard Wollheim (University of California in Berkeley)

Presentation

In 1989 took place in Donostia/San Sebastián (Spain) the 1st Inter-University Workshop on Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Its aim was to generate a group of discussion and co-operative work and to favour the international integration of Spanish philosophers.

These Workshops have a simple structure that has proved to be efficient. Each edition is hosted by a different University and has a prominent philosopher as invited speaker. In addition, a number of contributed papers are read (in English or Spanish) on any aspect of his/her work. The list of invited speakers includes Tyler Burge, Daniel Dennett, Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Jaegwon Kim, Ruth Millikan, Barry Stroud and, soon, Christopher Peacocke. The prestige of the speakers, the blind selection of papers, their limited number and the generosity of discussion time made possible the creation of a stable discussion group and the emergence of many young competent philosophers.

This group played an important role in the foundation of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ESAP) and the Spanish Society of Analytic Philosophy (SEFA) and has favoured the participation of Spanish philosophers in the most relevant international meetings and the increasing number of publications in prestigious journals and publishers.

The philosophical works and discussions encouraged by this initiative have tended to focus on the disciplines more "typically analytic", like the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind and epistemology, while no equivalent strategy in areas like ethics or aesthetics has crystallised so far. The main purpose of the Inter-University Workshop on Mind, Art, and Morality is to fill this gap by stimulating the kind of rigorous philosophical research and discussion of the analytic tradition on some open and often slippery issues on aesthetic and moral experience, argumentation, action and value assessment. These are issues that underlie any genuine philosophical thinking and in which ethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of mind converge and interweave. Therefore it is our hope that this initiative will help to create a space for discussion open to

philosophers from different fields sharing an interest in the rigorous analysis of such questions.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Papers are invited on all aspects of the work of Richard Wollheim. Submissions from scholars in the field of aesthetics, philosophy of the visual arts, philosophy of mind, epistemology, psychoanalysis, ethics and related philosophical areas are welcome, and young scholars are highly encouraged to participate.

Presentations should be 40 minutes long (with 20 additional minutes for discussion). Deadline for the receipt of papers (or, alternatively, abstracts of 1000 words) is March, 31st, 2002. Papers could be submitted (and presented) either in English or Spanish.

Each submission will be sent for blind selection to two members the Scientific Committee.

Correspondence and submissions should be sent to:

Maria Jos Alcaraz (mariajose.alcaraz@wanadoo.es)

Francisca Pérez Carro (fpc@um.es)

Universidad de Murcia

Departamento de Filosofía

30071 Murcia (Spain)

Tel. +34 968 36 34 65

Fax. +34 968 36 4266

For further information, please see the conference website.

<http://www.um.es/~facfilos/siamm1.htm>

Organizing Committee:

Josep E. Corb (Universitat de València)

Francisca Pérez Carro (Universidad de Murcia)

Carlos Thiebaut (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Scientific Committee:

Felix de Azua (Universidad Politécnica de Cataluña)

Jacques Bouveresse (College de France, Paris)

Valeriano Bozal (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

Manuel Cruz (Universidad de Barcelona)

Angel García (Universidad de Murcia)

Manuel García Carpintero (Universidad de Barcelona)

Julià Marrades (Universitat de València)

Salvador Rubio (Universidad de Murcia)

Marcelo Sabatés (Kansas State University)

Antonio Valdecantos (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Jos Luis Zalabardo (University College, London)

The Workshop is organized by the Department of Philosophy (Universidad de Murcia) under the auspices of the SEFA (Spanish Society of Analytic Philosophy) and the ESAP (European Society for Analytic Philosophy).

9 **Consciousness and Language**

6th meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness

May 31 to July 3, 2002

Museum of Science in Barcelona

Consciousness and language are related in many ways. We report our conscious experiences using language, and these verbal reports are perhaps the central tool for scientifically investigating human consciousness. We consciously experience linguistic stimuli such as words and sentences, and also process them unconsciously. A subject's language arguably helps to structure his or her conscious experience,

not least by shaping the subject's conceptual system. Some theorists have argued that language is essential to consciousness, and that infants and animals without language lack consciousness altogether.

This conference will explore the many connections between consciousness and language, from the perspectives of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, cognitive ethology, and artificial intelligence. Key questions include:

- * What is the relationship between consciousness and verbal report?
- * What is the role of verbal reports in the science of consciousness?
- * What are the characteristics of conscious and unconscious processing of language?
- * What are the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious processing of linguistic stimuli?
- * What role do language and concepts play in structuring conscious experience?
- * What is the neural basis of conceptual and nonconceptual aspects of consciousness?
- * What role did language play in the evolution of consciousness?
- * Is language necessary for consciousness?
- * What sort of consciousness, if any, is present in infants and non-human animals?

Confirmed speakers include: Jose Luis Bermudez, Ned Block, Anthony Jack, Ray Jackendoff, Daniel Povinelli, Jonathan Schooler, Luc Steels, Pio Tudela, Larry Weiskrantz, Philip Zelazo.

ASSC6 Program Committee: Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (chair), David Chalmers, Axel Cleeremans, Josep Macia, Philip Merikle, Geraint Rees, Larry Weiskrantz, Patrick

Wilken

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

While the plenary sessions at ASSC6 will largely deal with the theme of "Consciousness and Language", speakers in concurrent sessions are invited to talk on any topic relevant to the scientific study of consciousness. Submissions that include physiological, psychological, philosophical, and computational perspectives are all welcome.

Submissions for both posters and talks will be accepted (please specify preference). Any person may present only one submission, but may be co-author on more than one. Oral presentations will be limited to 20 minutes, to be followed by a 10-minute discussion period.

SUBMISSIONS MUST BE RECEIVED BY FEBRUARY 15, 2002.

All submissions for oral and poster presentation must include the following information in the order listed below:

1. Title.
2. Name, affiliation, and ASSC membership status of each co-author, with presenting co-author designated.
3. An abstract of up to 200 words.
4. Complete contact information for the author with whom the scientific programme committee will interact with about the submission: name, institutional affiliation, postal address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers.
5. An indication of whether the proposal is submitted as an oral or poster presentation, and an indication of willingness to present in the alternative format if your first preference cannot be accommodated.

To submit your proposal(s) for inclusion in the programme, please send

the information above by e-mail to logos@pcb.ub.es

REGISTRATION

Deadline for early registration: April 15, 2002
Registration fees: Early Late
Non-members 130 Euro 180 Euro
ASSC members 100 Euro 150 Euro
Students 60 Euro 100 Euro
Student ASSC members 40 Euro 80 Euro
Membership registration must be received by April 15, 2002 to ensure discount.
To register, please follow the instructions available from the conference website:
<http://assc.caltech.edu>
Address all enquiries about registration to dlopez@trivium.gh.ub.es

FURTHER INFORMATION

Please check the conference website for further information about the meeting, including information about paper and poster submissions; registration and submission forms; information about travel to Barcelona and accommodations; and information about the scientific programme of the meeting:

<http://assc.caltech.edu>

The site will be constantly updated to reflect the latest information. To enquire about any aspect of the conference, please write to the local organizer at dlopez@trivium.gh.ub.es.

To find out more about the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, and to apply for membership, please consult:
<http://assc.caltech.edu/>

□ **LOGICA 2002**

Zahr dky Castle (in central Bohemia), June 18 - 21, 2002.

The Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, announces the 16th event in the series of annual international symposia.

Since 1987 the annual LOGICA symposia have become an interdisciplinary platform for discussion of topical issues in logic among both internationally renowned scholars and young researchers. Traditionally, the symposia have no single theme. The official language of the symposium is English.

Jaakko Hintikka (Boston), Per Martin-Löf (Stockholm) Jeff Paris (Manchester), Rom Harré (Oxford) are invited speakers.

Contributions devoted to any of the wide range of logical problems are welcome except those focused on specialised technical applications. Particularly welcome are contributions that cover the issues interesting both for philosophically and for mathematically oriented logicians. The deadline for submitting contributed papers is February 28th. The notification of acceptance will be distributed by March 31st.

Selected contributions to LOGICA symposia are published by the Institute's publishing house Filosofia. Recent volumes collecting the contributions include, among others, papers from Nuel Belnap, Paul Benacerraf, Johan van Benthem, Jaakko Hintikka, David Lewis, Barbara Partee, Graham Priest, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Michael Resnik, Mark Sainsbury, Gabriel Sandu, Stewart Shapiro, Goran Sundholm, and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer.

There is a registration fee for the symposium covering full board and lodging at Zahr dky Castle during the symposium, travel expenses from Prague to Zahr dky and back, and a copy of the volume containing most of the contributions to the symposium. The fee amounts to US\$ 250 for participants or US\$ 200 for accompanying persons (volume not included).

If you are interested in reading a paper at the symposium, please send us a two-page abstract of the paper accompanied by a separate sheet with your name, contact address, and affiliation to the address below by 28 February 2002. E-mail submissions of postscript, pdf or MS Word compatible files are possible. Those who might have problems covering the expenses connected with taking part in the symposium are invited to apply for a grant. The organising committee will cover the registration fee for up to five selected applicants. Those who wish to apply for the grant should explicitly state this when submitting their abstract, which should be extended to five pages. The organising committee also may be able to contribute to travel expenses, in particular for scholars from countries with severely underfunded academic institutions.

For up-to-date information visit: <http://www.flu.cas.cz/Logica/Logica2002-1.htm>. Please direct all correspondence concerning the symposium to e-mail address: logica@mbox.cesnet.cz or to:

Timothy Childers & Vladim r Svoboda
Co-chairs of the Organising Committee of LOGICA 2002
Institute of Philosophy, ASCR
Jilsk 1, 110 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic
fax: +420-2/22220138

α **Intentionality: Past and Future**
Miskolc, June 21-23, 2002

Invited speakers include: Ned Block (NYU)
Tim Crane (UCL)
Ruth Garrett Millikan (University of Connecticut)
Organizers: G bor Forrai (University of Miskolc), forrai@ludens.elte.hu
Gy rgy Kampis (Lor nd E tv s University), gk@hps.elte.hu
Information: <http://hps.elte.hu/intentionality.html>

Intentionality has been a central issue in the analytical philosophy of mind and in cognitive science since the seventies. The conference aims at exploring the various problems connected with the notion, conceptual as well as empirical: intentionality and the representational theory of mind, mental content, intentionality and mental causation, intentionality and consciousness, intentionality and the theory of evolution, intentionality and agency, etc. An equally important objective is to examine how the understanding of intentionality prevalent in the analytic approach is related to the continental approaches stemming from Brentano and Husserl.

The papers will be about 30 minutes long.
Abstracts should not exceed two pages (12 pts, Times New Roman, 1.5 line-spacing). Preferably they should be submitted as attached files to G bor Forrai, but they can also be sent by traditional mail to: History of Philosophy Department, University of Miskolc, H-3515 Miskolc-Egyetemv ros, Hungary.

Deadline for abstracts: January 31, 2002.

Venue

University of Miskolc (UM), Hungary (www.uni-miskolc.hu)
During the conference there will be an organized excursion to the famous wine growing region of Tokaj.

Miskolc is located in the northeast of Hungary, two hours from Budapest by express train.
UM is located on a separate campus outside town with lots of green and a pleasant atmosphere for discussion.

Program Committee:

G bor Forrai (University of Miskolc), forrai@ludens.elte.hu
Ferenc Huoranszki (Central European University), huoransz@ceu.hu
Gy rgy Kampis (Lor nd E tv s University), gk@hps.elte.hu
Bal zs Mezei (Lor nd E tv s University), bmmezei@ludens.elte.hu
Csaba Pl h (University of Szeged), pleh@edpsy.u-szeged.hu
Tibor Schwendtner (University of Miskolc), h6171sch@ella.hu

The conference is partially sponsored by the Hungarian National Research Foundation (OTKA) and the Hungarian Ministry of Education (FKFP and NKFP target programmes).

Information about accommodation, satellite events, etc. will be posted later.

• **KARL POPPER 2002**
CENTENARY CONGRESS
Wednesday, 3 July 2002 — Sunday, 7 July 2002
SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT

The international Congress planned to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Karl Popper (1902-1994) will open officially under the patronage of the President of Austria Dr Thomas Klestil in the late afternoon of Wednesday 3 July 2002 and close in the late afternoon of Sunday 7 July 2002. Meetings will be held at the campus and in the main building of the University of Vienna, and in the City Hall (Rathaus), which is adjacent to the University main building.

The work of the Congress will be arranged in seven sections.

- 1 Philosophy of the physical sciences
- 2 Philosophy of the biological sciences
- 3 Philosophy of the social sciences
- 4 Moral & political philosophy
- 5 Logic & scientific method
- 6 Epistemology & metaphysics
- 7 Life & times of Karl Popper

Invited lectures and symposia are planned for all sections. Contributed papers relevant to Popper's work will be invited in all sections (though papers tackling problems appropriate to more than one section will be welcome). Potential contributors are asked to bear in mind that a period of 30 minutes will be allotted to each contributed paper, including discussion. Full details of the form in which abstracts are to be submitted will be provided in the official Call for Papers, which will be circulated late in the summer of 2001 together with registration and hotel booking forms. The deadline for the submission of abstracts will be early in 2002. All abstracts will be refereed. Letters of acceptance will be mailed not later than 1 April 2002. The Congress languages are English and German.

For more information, please contact Gerhard Budin at the University of Vienna, Department for Philosophy of Science, Sensengasse 8/10, A-1090 Vienna (fax: +43-1-4277-9476), preferably by e-mail: <karlpopper2002.econ@univie.ac.at>. The Congress website situated at <http://www.univie.ac.at/karlpopper2002> will be kept up to date at all times.

overleaf: Programme Committee, Organizing Committee

Programme Committee

Hans Albert (Heidelberg)
Gunnar Andersson (Ume Universitet)
Andreas Bartels (Universit t Bonn)
Ingrid Belke (Stuttgart)
Michelle-Ir ne Brudny (Institut d' tudes Politiques de Lille)
Fred Eidlin (University of Guelph)
Volker Gadenne (Universit t Linz)
Malachi Hacohen (Duke University, Durham NC)

John Hall (McGill University, Montreal)
 Ian Jarvie (York University, Toronto)
 Bernulf Kanitscheider (Universität Gießen)
 Hubert Kiesewetter (Universität Eichstätt)
 Makoto Kogawara (Kagoshima University)
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 Renan Springer de Freitas (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte)
 Friedrich Stadler (Universität Wien)
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 Geoffrey Stokes (University of Brisbane)
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 Gerhard Budin, *Secretary* (Universität Wien, Karl-Popper-Institut)
 Volker Gadenne (Universität Linz)
 Erich Kadlec (Karl-Popper-Institut)
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 Wolfgang Maderthaner (Verein für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Wien)
 Peter Markl (Universität Wien)
 Siegfried Mattl (Universität Wien, Österreichische Gesellschaft für Zeitgeschichte)
 Tamas Meleghy (Universität Innsbruck)
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 Erhard Oeser, *Chair* (Universität Wien, Karl-Popper-Institut)
 Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Universität Wien)
 Kurt Salamun (Universität Graz)
 Friedrich Stadler (Universität Wien, Institut Wiener Kreis)
 Gerhard Zecha (Universität Salzburg)

□ **LOGIC COLLOQUIUM 2002**
 (ASL European Summer Meeting)
 August 3 - 10, 2002
 Institut fuer Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung
 Muenster (Germany)

The European summer meeting of the ASL in the year 2002 will be held in Muenster, Germany:

<http://wwwmath.uni-muenster.de/LC2002/>

Invited speakers:

Jeremy Avigad (Pittsburgh PA)
 Arnold Beckmann (Wien)
 Tim Carlson (Columbus OH)
 Robert Constable (Ithaca NY)
 Kosta Dosen (Toulouse)
 Moti Gitik (Tel Aviv)

Volker Halbach (Konstanz)
Bakhadyr Khoussainov (Auckland)
Steffen Lempp (Madison WI)
Toniann Pitassi (Tucson AZ)
Thomas Scanlon (Berkeley CA)
Ralf Schindler (Wien)
Patrick Speissegger (Madison WI)
Katrin Tent (W rzburg)

Tutorials by:

Lev Beklemishev (Utrecht/Moscow)
Steven Cook (Toronto ON)
Olivier Lessmann (Chicago IL)
Simon Thomas (Piscataway NJ)

You can now pre-register by sending us a completed pre-registration form by fax. You can find the pre-registration form and the information needed to pre-register at:

<http://wwwmath.uni-muenster.de/LC2002/registration.html>

All people who pre-registered will be on our e-mail list and receive all information updates about the conference.

Registration will ***NOT*** include a hotel reservation. Make sure that you visit our accommodation page

<http://wwwmath.uni-muenster.de/LC2002/accomm.html>

to select a hotel and book a room in advance. The later you organize your hotel room, the more complicated (and the more expensive) it will get.

α **25th International Wittgenstein Symposium**
11—17 August 2002
Kirchberg am Wechsel, Lower Austria

Persons - An Interdisciplinary Approach

Sections

1. Wittgenstein
2. The Metaphysics of Mind and Body
3. Persons and the Theory of Mind
4. The Self: Philosophy, Psychology, Neurobiology
5. Persons as Agents
6. Personal Identity

Workshops:

- A: Human Dignity and the Concept of a Person
- B: Juridical Aspects of Persons
- C: Medical Aspects of Persons

Organizing Institution:
The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Organization and Scientific Direction:
C. Kanzian, J. Quitterer, E. Runggaldier
(University of Innsbruck)

Speakers:
Ansgar BECKERMANN (Bielefeld), Radu BOGDAN (Louvain), Johannes BRANDL (Salzburg), Franz BYDLINSKI (Wien), Antonella CORRADINI (Milano), Fred DRETSKE (Duke), Peter FIEDLER (Heidelberg), Alvin GOLDMAN (Rutgers), Robert M. GORDON (St. Louis), Thomas HILL (Chapel Hill), L. JANSEN (Münster), Jaegwon KIM (Brown), Jens KULENKAMPPF (Erlangen), Jonathan LOWE (Durham), Johannes MAREK (Graz), Uwe MEIXNER (Notre Dame), Albert NEWEN (Bonn), Julian NIDA-RÜMELIN (Berlin), Martine NIDA-RÜMELIN (Fribourg), Georg NORTHOFF (Harvard), Josef PERNER (Salzburg), Klaus PUHL (Graz), Günther RAGER (Fribourg), Antti REVONSUO (Turku), Sonja RINOFNER-KREIDL (Graz), Peter SCHABER (Zürich), Barry SMITH (Buffalo/Leipzig), Markus STEPANIANS (Saarbrücken), Ralf STOECKER (Bielefeld), Michael TYE (Temple), Henrik WALTER (Ulm), and others.

Call for Papers:

For an application form plus guidelines for papers (deadline: 30 April 2002) please contact: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, Phone and Fax: +43 2641 2557. The conference languages are English and German. Accepted papers will be published before the start of the symposium.

For further information consult: <http://www.sbg.ac.at/phs/alws/wittgenstein02.htm>

□ **INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM**
Philosophical Insights into Logic and Mathematics:
The History and Outcome of Alternative Semantics and Syntax
September 30 - October 4, 2002, NANCY, France

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Information about the Symposium, together with an on-line Registration Form,
are available from the Symposium home page:
<http://www.univ-nancy2.fr/ACERHP/colloques/symp02/Symp02-angl.html>

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; Laboratoire de Philosophie et d'Histoire des Sciences-Archives Henri
Poincar (UMR 7117)
; Universit de Nancy 2
; Beth-Foundation (Amsterdam)
; Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (Amsterdam)
; Goethe Institut (Nancy)

Founded in 1992, the Laboratoire de Philosophie et d'Histoire des Sciences -
Archives Henri Poincar (LPHS-AHP) is an Unit mixte de Recherche du Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). Besides the conservation of

Poincaré's writings and the collection of documents related to his work, its members conduct research projects concentrating on the philosophy and history of logic, mathematics and physics from 1850 to 1950. Following the International Congress - Henri Poincaré (Nancy 1994) and the Nelson Goodman Conference (Pont-à-Mousson 1997), the Logic Symposium of 2002 is the third large conference organized by the Archives.

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Towards the end of the 20th century the following question arises: Is translatability into the language of set theory and logic really the exclusive form of justification and rigor in mathematics? Since Poincaré there have always been some outsiders who rejected the standard view about the foundations of mathematics. Formulated in modern terms, Poincaré held that the varieties of formal logical theories—which he thought to be considerably attached to set operations—don't express the structure which is essential for a genuine understanding of mathematics. One possible alternative were: "Mathematics without foundations," and it could be evidenced by the fact that the existence of formally undecidable propositions (within a given arithmetical system) or of problems unsettled by standard axioms (within set theory) does not obstruct the development of a viable and, in fact, powerful science. Accordingly, the foundational view of mathematics itself might then be suspect. Mathematics can and has to be understood from mathematical praxis alone.

Nevertheless, we would like to formalize truth, for classical model theory depends on truth definitions. As long as these definitions can only be given in a language of second-order or in set theory, model theory depends on second-order logic or set theory. But category theorists have defended the view that there are foundational operations different from set operations. Is this a way-out?

Further, recent years have witnessed a gradually increasing interest in the study of game-based semantics, such as GTS, dialogical logic, or Hintikka's IF-logic. Lately, these game-based approaches have been formulated with the help of mathematical game theory (van Benthem) and category theory (Hyland). In addition, they proved to be very effective for the formal study of linear, paraconsistent and non-monotonic logics, among others. By these developments, traditional views and received wisdom concerning the relations between syntax, semantics and pragmatics, between constructivist and classical positions, and the role of logic in foundations seem to be challenged.

Finally, most of the time the question concerning the foundations of mathematics tacitly assumes that what is to be founded is the mathematics as done by professional mathematicians of the 20th century. However, many historical, anthropological or sociological works have shown that mathematical activity is much more diverse than hitherto thought. If we accept, at least partially, that to found mathematics is relative to the practice of mathematics itself, then it is necessary to investigate the mathematics (and the mathematicians) of other cultures and other periods as well as their conception and practice of foundations.

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The conference will feature three sections in which the subject will be

considered from a philosophical, historical or, if it comes with some philosophical insight, even technical point of view.

ı Section 1

Mathematical structures in foundations of mathematics: sets, categories and models

ı Section 2

Logical and cognitive aspects of foundations of mathematics: games, dialogues, and cognitive architecture

ı Section 3

Historical and Cultural Perspectives on foundations of mathematics

=====

COMITE D'HONNEUR

Paul Gochet, Gilles-Gaston Granger, Jaakko Hintikka, Kuno Lorenz, Roshdi Rashed.

ORGANISATION COMMITTEE

Jean-Paul Amann, Johan van Benthem, Bernd Buldt, Dominique Fagnot, Dominique Flament, Jean-Louis Greffe, Gerhard Heinzmann, Ralf Kr mer, Philippe Nabonnand, Shahid Rahman, Manuel Rebuschi, Helge R ckert, Anne-Fran oise Schmid, Joseph Vidal-Rosset, Henk Visser

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INVITED LECTURES

Newton Da Costa, Geoffrey Hellman, Jaakko Hintikka, F. William Lawvere, Stewart Shapiro.

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CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

The written text of a contributed paper (talk or poster) may not exceed the equivalent of 30 minutes.

Contributions may be given in French, English, or German.

Authors are kindly asked to submit a three page abstract before DECEMBER 20, 2001. Abstracts should be attached to an email in either rtf- or pdf-format.

In addition, 3 hard copies must be sent by snail-mail to:

Archives Henri-Poincar
LPHS-AHP, Universit de Nancy 2
F-54 015 Nancy-Cedex
France

Tel/Fax: [+33] 383 96 70 83

Email: English and French: Manuel.Rebuschi@clsh.univ-nancy2.fr

German: Bernd.Buldt@uni-konstanz.de

Accepted abstracts will be reproduced from the hard copies, so there will be no opportunity for later revisions. Please type the title of your paper in capital letters. Start with the title and your name. Authors will be notified by February 15, 2002.

A selection of papers will be published with Kluwer.

The conference fee is 68 euros (450 FF), for students and unemployed 23 euros (150 FF). If payment is made after February 28, 2002, the fee is 84 euros (550 FF) (students 38 euros, 250 FF). Please remit to the following bank account:

Name: M. l'Agent comptable secondaire du CNRS d l gation r gionale du Nord Est.

Compte : 00003002578, code banque : 10071, code guichet : 54000, cl : 82.

The next circular will contain the program of the Symposium and a form for hotel booking. It is expected to appear in December 2001.

We would be grateful if you used this circular to spread information about the Symposium and we would be happy to send further copies on request.

*** Please remember the following deadlines: ***

¡ Deadline for abstracts of contributed papers:
December 20, 2001

¡ Deadline for prepayment of the registration fee:
February 28, 2002

=====

REGISTRATION FORM

(to return before February 28, 2002 to
Archives Henri Poincar
LPHS-AHP, Universit de Nancy 2
F-54 015 Nancy Cedex
E-mail :
English and French : Manuel.Rebuschi@clsh.univ-nancy2.fr
German : Bernd.Buldt@uni-konstanz.de)

Please type or use block capitals!

I plan to attend the International Symposium
Philosophical Insights into Logic and Mathematics:
The History and Outcome of Alternative Semantics and Syntax
taking place from September 30 to October 4, 2002 in Nancy, France.

- I will take part
- I will present a paper

Family name: _____
First name: _____
Title: _____
Institute: _____
Address: _____

Country: _____
Phone: _____

Fax: _____

E-mail: _____

Title of the paper: _____

Date Signature

=====

CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENTS

α **8th Italo-Spanish Meeting of Analytic Philosophy**
Santiago de Compostela, Spain, November 19-20, 2001

Organized by:

rea de L gica y Filosof a de la Ciencia de la USC
Sociedad Espa ola de Filosof a Anal tica (SEFA)
Societ Italiana di Filosofia Analitica (SIFA)

Sponsored by:

Universidade de Santiago de Compostela (Spain)
Secretaria Xeral de Investigaci n e Desenvolvemento (Xunta de Galicia)
Secretar a de Estado de Pol tica Cient fica y Tecnol gica (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog a)

Programme

Monday, November the 19th, Morning Session

09.00 Documentation Delivery

09.30 Opening Session

10.00 Lecture: Joan Pag s (Universitat de Girona), *Some remarks on truth-makers*

10.45 Discussant: Andrea Iacona (Universit di Parma)

11.05 Debate

11.30 Break

12.00 Lecture: Daniele Giarretta (Universit di Padova), *Normativity of meaning and normativity of logic*

12.45 Discussant: Fernando Mart nez (Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea)

13.05 Debate

Afternoon Session

16.00 Lecture: Agustin Arrieta (Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea), *On Necessity*

16.45 Discussant: Vittorio Morato (Universit di Bologna)

17.05 Debate

18.00 Lecture: Alberto Voltolini (Universit del Piemonte Orientale) *Soulless yet non-natural qualia*

18.45 Discussant: Manuel de Pinedo (Universidad de Granada)

19.05 Debate

Tuesday, November the 20th, Morning Session

10.00 Lecture: Lorenzo Pe a (CSIC), *The binding force of promises*

- 10.45 Discussant: Elisabetta Sacchi (Universit di Padova).
 11.05 Debate
- 12.00 Lecture: Carlo Filotico (Universit degli Studi de Milano), *Deflationary accounts of generalisations about truth*
 12.45 Discussant: Dan Lopez de Sa (Universitat de Barcelona)
 13.05 Debate
- 16.00 Lecture: Paco Calvo Garz n (Universidad de Murcia), *State space semantics and the collateral information challenge*
 16.45 Discussant: Andrea Bianchi (Universit del Piemonte Orientale, Universit di Bologna)
 17.05 Debate

third italo-german analytic philosophy colloquium
 dipartimento di filosofia
 via bolognese 52, firenze.....
 universit degli studi di firenze

Novembre 29 — December 1, 2001

Programme

november 29	november 30	december 1
	9.30 comments: tobias rosefeldt (heidelberg) thomas schmidt (g ttingen): on what intentions are good for comments: marina sbis (trieste)	9.30 comments: vittorio morato (bologna) marcello frixione (salerno): "linguistic" vs. "non-linguistic" representations in the cognitive sciences comments: andreas kemmerling (heidelberg)
14.00 g tz-a. klages (hamburg): on belief ascription comments: carlo penco (genova) francesco ferretti (cosenza): perception and imagery	14.00 sergio bernini (firenze): facts comments: wolfgang carl (g ttingen) sven rosenkranz (berlin): on cognitivism, closure and logical revisionism	

q. **CONCEIVABILITY AND POSSIBILITY**
 7th and 8th December, 2001,

Kinderstube, Salle Laure Dupraz, rue de l'Hpital 4, 1700 Fribourg

UNIVERSIT DE FRIBOURG SUISSE /
UNIVERSIT T FREIBURG SCHWEIZ
D PARTEMENT DE PHILOSOPHIE/ DEPARTEMENT DER PHILOSOPHIE
Tel. 026 / 300 7524, Fax 026 / 300 9786, e-mail: philosophic@unifr.ch

Friday, December 7, 2001

8.30 - 10.30 h **Joseph Levine** *Thick versus thin conceivability*
Ohio State University (Commentator: Etienne Parrat)

Pause

10.45 - 12.45 h **Johannes Haag** *Conceivability and Intuition. Methodological Remarks*
University of Munich (Commentator: N.N.)

14.30 - 16.30 h **Richard Swinburne** *Mental-Physical Identity Theories*
University of Oxford (Commentator: Annalisa Coliva)

Saturday, December 8, 2001

8.30 - 10.30 h **Stephen White** *Why the Property Dualism Argument Won't Go Away*
Tufts University (Boston) (Commentator: Davor Bodrozic)

Pause

10.45 - 12.45 **Armin Tatzel** *Concepts: Answering Fodor's Challenge*
University of Geneva (Commentator: N.N.)

14.30 - 16.30 **Martine Nida-R melin** *Another Two-dimensionalist Argument for Property*
University of Fribourg *Dualism*
(Commentator: N.N.)

Der Workshop ist fr alle Interessenten offen
Le workshop est ouvert toutes les personnes int ress es

Prof. Dr. Martine Nida-R melin

Lehrstuhl fr Philosophie des Menschen und der
Humanwissenschaften
Chaire de philosophie de l'Homme et des sciences
humaines

Prof. Dr. Gianfranco Soldati

Lehrstuhl fr neuzeitliche und zeitgen ssische
Philosophie

Chaire de philosophie moderne et contemporaine

q **SOCIEDAD ESPA OLA DE FILOSOFIA ANALTICA IIIrd. Congress:**
Granada, December 13-15, 2001

La Sociedad Espa ola de Filosofa Anal tica (S.E.F.A.) calls for papers in any field of analytic philosophy on the occasion of its 3rd. Congress to be held in Granada (Spain) from the 13rd to the 15th of December, 2001. The congress is organized by the Department of Philosophy of the University of

Granada (Granada, Spain). The languages of the congress are English and Spanish. All accepted papers shall be published prior to the congress in a proceedings volume.

Congress fees are the following:

(i) SEFA members: 6.000 pesetas (36 euros), if payment is received by October 20; 8.500 ptas (51 euros) afterwards.

(ii) Participants not belonging to SEFA: 12.000 pesetas (72.12 euros), if payment is received by October 20; 17.000 ptas (102.2 euros) afterwards.

(iii) Students: 4.000 pesetas (24 euros), if payment is received by October 20; 6.000 ptas (36 euros) afterwards.

Payment of congress fee covers receipt of the program, the proceeding volume, as well as participation in all its scientific events.

Being Granada a tourist town, it is plenty of hotels and hostals, usually with quite reasonable standards and not necessarily expensive. Because of it, the Congress Office does not provide accomodation.

However, in the Second Announcement a list of hotels and hostals will be included to facilitate people to make hotel reservations.

The III SEFA Congress Office address: Department of Philosophy, University of Granada, Campus "La Cartuja", 18011 Granada, Spain. FAX: 34-(9)58-248981

The Organizing Committee (Department of Philosophy, University of Granada):

Juan Acero acero@ugr.es

M» Jos Fr polli frapolli@ugr.es

Esther Romero eromero@ugr.es

Javier Rodr guez Alc zar frodguez@ugr.es

¶ **CONCEPTS**

December 17-19, 2001, Bologna

Sala Riunioni, via Azzo Gardino 23

Universit degli Studi di Bologna

Dipartimento di Discipline della comunicazione

monday 17

10.30, Tim Crane (University College, London)

Concepts, Content and Non-conceptual Content 15.00, Mark Siebel (Universitat Leipzig)

Concepts and Coherence 17.00, Andrea Bianchi (Universit del Piemonte Orientale)

Concepts, Words, and Perceptual Track tuesday 18

09.00, Kevin Mulligan (Universit de Geneve)

Formal Concepts

11.00, Gloria Origgi (Universit di Bologna)

Varieties of Deference

15.00, Georges Rey (University of Maryland)

The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and Empiricism about Concepts

17.00, Paolo Leonardi (Universit di Bologna)

Matter of Concept

wednesday 19

09.00, Vittorio Gallese (Universit di Parma)

Naturalizing Concepts: a Neurophysiological Perspective

11.00, Francois Recanati (Centre Jean Nicod, Paris)

Indexical Concepts and Compositionality

15.00, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (Universidad de Barcelona)

Referential Concepts and Normative Presuppositions

17.00, Dan Sperber (Centre Jean Nicod, Paris)

Intuitive and Reflective Concepts

For further information email to andrea bianchi: an.bianchi@libero.it

α **PERSPECTIVES ON IMITATION: FROM COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE**

Royaumont Abbey, France, 24-26 May 2002

Sponsored by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation, London, and the Lifelong Learning Foundation, Manchester

website: www.imitationconference.org

Organizers: Prof. S. Hurley and Prof. N. Chater, University of Warwick

Registrations now being accepted. Registration materials available on website or by request from our administrator at

imitation@breathemail.net. Places are very limited.

List of speakers and topics below.

Imitation, one of the primary forms of social learning, is often thought of as a low-level, relatively childish or even mindless phenomenon. This may be a serious mistake. It is beginning to look, in light of recent work in the cognitive sciences, as if imitation is a rare, perhaps even uniquely human ability, which may be fundamental to what is distinctive about human learning, intelligence, and culture. If so, this will have important consequences for our understanding of ourselves both individually and socially. For example, it may have implications for our conceptions of autonomy, rationality, and freedom of expression, and for policies concerning education and media violence. Social learning by imitation may not only be a mechanism by which children acquire culture, but may also have pervasive influence throughout adulthood, in ways that we are only just beginning to understand.

The purpose of the conference is to bring together the world's leading figures working on imitation from various disciplines in order to relate and integrate different research traditions. The cognitive sciences have made significant recent advances in the study of imitation. We aim to make these accessible to the social sciences, so as to clarify their philosophical and social importance, and facilitate cross-fertilization between the cognitive and social sciences in this area.

Speakers:

Giacomo Rizzolatti, The Mirror System in Monkeys and Humans
Vittorio Gallese, The "shared manifold" hypothesis: from mirror neurons to empathy

Jean Decety, Functional neuroanatomy of imitation and agency in humans

Celia Heyes, Imitation from Associative Sequence Learning

Richard Byrne, A mechanistic theory of skill learning by imitation

Wolfgang Prinz, An Ideomotor Approach to Imitation

Marcel Kinsbourne, Imitation and What Lies Beneath: Neurodevelopmental Considerations

Irene Pepperberg, Evidence for Multiple Levels of Avian Vocal Imitation in Grey Parrots

(*Psittacus erithacus*)

Andrew Whiten, Selective Imitation in Ape and Child: A Window on the Construal of Others' Actions

Andrew Meltzoff, Imitation and Theory of Mind

Alvin Goldman, Imitation, simulation, and mindreading

Moshe Anisfeld, Imitation and Representation in Infancy.

Michael Tomasello, Intention Reading and Cultural Learning

Robert Sugden, Imitation and Rationality
Diego Gambetta, Mimicry: imitating and protecting group identities in humans
Merlin Donald, Imitation viewed in the light of human cultural genesis
Francisco Gil-White: Memes don't replicate: so what? Undoing the tyranny of the genetic metaphor.
Ap Dijksterhuis, The perception-behavior expressway: automatic effects of social perception on social behavior
John Eldridge, What effects do the treatment of violence on the mass media have on people's conduct? A controversy re-considered.
Paul Harris, On learning what not to do
William Durham, The Control of Imitation and Its Cultural Implications

Commentators:

R. Gordon, B. Galef, J. Nadel, S. Jones, P. Seabright, S. Blackmore, S. Brison, G. Comstock, P. Huesmann, G. Claxton, M. Greenberg, N. Rawlins, and others

SEMINAR AND WORKSHOP PROGRAMMES

III. WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGY: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AT THEIR INTERFACE

Escuela de Empresariales de Bilbao - Bilboko Enpresa Eskola.
Universidad del País Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea (UPV-EHU).
November 22nd and 23rd, 2001.

The third edition of the workshop on Economics and Philosophy, organised by the Ctedra Miguel Sánchez-Mazas and the Fundación Urrutia Elejalde, is devoted to the connections between Economics and Biology, or, more generally, between the Social and the Natural Sciences. It will try to center on the philosophical and methodological questions suggested by those connections.

Three perspectives are proposed. In the first place, from some years ago some theoretical economists are undertaking the idea that economic phenomena can be understood as evolutionary phenomena, both in the sense that economic reality is continuously changing (and so it can hardly be grasped by static equilibrium models), and, more interestingly from a methodological point of view, in the sense that the best tools to analyse those phenomena are those that explicitly show their dynamic aspects. Among these tools, we can particularly mention evolutionary game theory, as an example of a discipline that emerged in the realm of economic theory, was later successfully applied to biology, and now is deeply used again in economics thanks to that conceptual fertilisation.

In the second place, there is the reciprocal idea that many biological phenomena can be studied as economic phenomena, in the sense that they can be seen as the result of the interaction between many agents, attempting each one (usually in an unconscious way) to reach the state which is better for it. The application of this perspective has originated a discipline as controverted as dynamic: sociobiology. This is a particularly polemic discipline, amongst other things, because the strange use of the category of egotistic behaviour to agents such as genes, or even memes, and because the usually reductionist view of human beings which is derived from many of the contributions to that discipline.

In the third place, the topic of the connections between economic activity and the ecosystem (or ecosystems) has received a great deal of attention. Some particularly interesting questions are to what extent is economic development compatible with the preservation of the environment, how can it be made an economic valuation of this environment, why have ecological concerns been usually discarded from the discussions within orthodox economics, or to what extent an understanding of social relations is a prerequisite to a full understanding the connections between ecology and economics.

These three perspectives have usually been developed independently of each other. The aim of this workshop is not only presenting them to the interested people, but also promoting, as far as possible, their mutual integration.

PROGRAMA

Jueves, 22 de noviembre.

Thursday, november 22nd.

Mañana. Morning.

10:00. Presentación.

Presentation.

Sesión 1. Economía, biología y evolución.

Economics, biology and evolution.

10:15. Geoffrey Hodgson (Universidad de Herts, Reino Unido):
"Darwinism in Economics: From Analogy to Ontology"

11:45. Descanso. *Coffee break.*

12:15. Jack Vromen (Universidad Erasmus, Rotterdam, Países Bajos):

"Evolutionary Theory and Economics: Going Beyond Selection Arguments"

Tarde. Afternoon.

Sesión 2. Economía y ecología.

Economics and ecology.

16:00. Joan Martínez-Alier (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona):

17:30. *Sesión de comunicaciones.*

Session for communications.

Viernes, 23 de noviembre.
Friday, november 23rd.

Mañana. Morning.

Sesión 3. Teoría de juegos evolutivos.
Evolutionary game theory.

9:30. Fernando Vega Redondo (Universidad de Alicante):
"Rationality and equilibrium selection: an evolutionary viewpoint"

11:00. Descanso. *Coffee break.*

Sesión 4. Sociobiología y memética.
Sociobiology and memetics.

11:15. Robert Auger (Universidad de Cambridge, Reino Unido):
"Replication versus inheritance in the evolution of culture"

12:45. Jos Sanmartín (Universidad de Valencia):
"Sociobiología y determinismo biológico en el marco de la naturaleza humana".

For	more	information	contact:
Sánchez-Mazas	Katedra		(UPV/EHU)
Avda. Alcalde Jos	Elosegi,	275.	20.015
Tfno.	943	28	84
Fax	943	28	06
sanchez-mazas@sc.ehu.es			DONOSTIA
			00
			23

□ **SEMINAR ON MIND AND LANGUAGE, 2001/02**
ON TUESDAYS, H 11-13
AULA SEMINARI,
ABBAZIA DI S. ANDREA,
C.SO G. FERRARIS
VERCELLI

23.10.2001
Enrique Villanueva (UNAM Mexico)
"Theoretical Functionalism"
27.11.2001
Maurizio Ferraris (Università di Torino)
"Sul mondo esterno"
15.1.2002
Stelios Virvidakis (University of Athens)
"Varieties of Quietism"
19.2.2002
Michael Tye (Temple University)
"The Unity of Perceptual Experience"
26.2.2002
Wolfram Hinzen (Universität Regensburg)
Truth's Fabric. On the Role of Truth in Human Cognition
19.3.2002

Annalisa Coliva (Università di Bologna)

6.4.2002

Marta Splanzi (Università de Paris)

Usi e abusi dell'analogia. Galileo e le montagne della luna

23.4.2002

Lynne Rudder Baker (University of Massachusetts)

MISCELLANEOUS

BOOKS

Annalisa Coliva, Elisabetta Sacchi, *Singular Thoughts. Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts and I-Thoughts*. Quodlibet, 2001, pp. 185

Preface. Introduction. 1. Russell's Principle and the Neo-Fregean Strategy in Philosophy of Mind: 1 RP in Russell's Argumentative Strategy: Its Role and Its Meaning 2 Going Beyond Russell's Restrictions: Two Strategies in Philosophy of Mind 3 Evans' Defence of RP 4 Assessing Evans' Interpretation and Defence of RP 5 Evans' Account Revisited 2. Perceptual Demonstrative Thoughts: 1 Some Objections Against the Indispensability of the Notion of Sense in an Account of Demonstrative Thoughts 2 Evans' Account of Perception-Based Demonstrative Thoughts (1 The Information-Based Character of Demonstrative Thoughts 2 The Insufficiency of the Information-Links for Demonstrative Identification) 3 How to Characterise Demonstrative Senses 4 Assessing Evans' Account: The Role of Location in Demonstrative Identification 3. At the Origin of the Theory of I-Thoughts and the Epistemological Turn of the Notion of Sinn: 1 I-Thoughts 2 Frege 3 The Dispute Between Evans and Perry 4 The Epistemological Turn of the Notion of Cognitive Sinn 5 Evans and the Objectivity Requirement 4. Self-Knowledge and I-Thoughts: 1 IEM Relative to Physical Self-Ascriptions As "The Most Powerful Antidote to a Cartesian Conception of the Self" (1 IEM of Bodily Self-Ascriptions Based on Somatic Proprioception 2 IEM of Physical Self-Ascriptions Based on Outer Perception 3 IEM of Self-Ascriptions Based on Memory) 2 Non-Conceptual Content: Perceptual and Somatic Proprioceptive Content 3 Mental Self Ascriptions and IEM: Why the Cartesian Cannot Get Off the Ground 4 Against the Cartesian Conception of the Mind I. The Case of Beliefs 5 Against the Cartesian Conception of the Mind II. The Case of Outer Perceptions, Hume's Point and the Case of Inner Perceptions 6 Against the Idealist Conception of Mental States as Un-Owned 7 The Constitutive Role of [I] 8 Why Non-Inferential Mental Self-Ascriptions are Logically IEM 9 Conclusions

JOBS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND ESSAY PRIZES FOR PHILOSOPHERS

□ **UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG, Germany.**

Under the auspices of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, the German Government's Program for Investment in the Future and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the University of Leipzig invites applications for **ten post-doctoral fellowships** of between one and three years in the period April 2002-March 2005. Fellows will be required to be resident in Leipzig. They will work on a highly innovative interdisciplinary project in formal ontology involving philosophers, computer scientists and medical information scientists. The work of the project will be carried out in English. Please send a CV, three letters of reference, and a writing sample giving evidence of strong formal skills to the director of the project: Barry Smith, Department of Philosophy, 135 Park Hall, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150. The deadline for applications for fellowships beginning in 2002 is December 15, 2001. Further information is available at: <http://www.ontology.uni-leipzig.de/>

This will appear in the next° issue of Jobs for Philosophers.
There are more details here:

<http://www.humboldt-foundation.de/en/aktuelles/presse/pn/index.htm>

JOURNALS

α **Diritto e Questioni Pubbliche**

At the URL address <http://www.dirittoequestionipubbliche.org> you will find the first volume of "Diritto e Questioni Pubbliche", an e-journal devoted to the philosophy of law, legal theory and legal culture.

You are welcome to consult the journal and to send us your comments.

The editorial board

Giorgio Maniaci, Giorgio Pino, Aldo Schiavello

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Francesco Viola

[*Oggettività e verità dei valori*](#)

Aldo Schiavello

[*Modest objectivity ed interpretazione del diritto*](#)

Vittorio Villa

[*Alcune chiarificazioni concettuali sulla nozione di inclusive positivism*](#)

Jos Juan Moreso

[*In defense of inclusive legal positivism*](#)

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Susanna Pozzolo

[*Inclusive positivism: alcune critiche*](#)

Note critiche e recensioni

Giorgio Pino

[*recensione a "Bruno Celano, La teoria del diritto di Hans Kelsen. Una introduzione critica"*](#)

α **Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics**

the new issue of *Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics*, the e-journal of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Trieste, is on line.

Access is free of charge at:

http://www.univ.trieste.it/~dipfilo/etica_e_politica/2001_1/index.html

Index of *Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics*, vol. I, 1, 2001:

Monographica: The future of gene

Pfeffer - Guest Editor's Preface

Haker - Ethical aspects of pre-natal genetic diagnostics

Levi - Human germline manipulation: technical limits and future perspectives

Honnefelder - Bioethics and Human Genetics: Consensus Formation in Europe

Brunetta d'Usseaux - Wrongful life and wrongful birth cases: a comparative approach

Ciliberti - Genetic Intervention: Rights and Ethical Values

Pedrucci - The Problem of Communication on the Subject of Biotechnology

Celada - Education in ethics for Biotechnologists

Varia:

Derrida - Tempo e pena di morte

Vigna - Sul dono come relazione pratica trascendentale

Pieretti - Trascendentalit e ragione argomentativa

Cowley - [Moral Dilemmas in Greek Tragedies: a Discussion of Aeschylus's Agamemnon and Sophokles's Antigone](#)

Schiavello - [Due concezioni della ragione pubblica a confronto. Dissezione analitica della nozione rawlsiana di ragione pubblica](#)

de Mori - [In defense of moral rights](#)

☞ **OTHER ELECTRONIC JOURNALS**

<http://www.dla.utexas.edu/depts/philosophy/faculty/causey/>

This is a page where different electronic journals are dealt with. Among the journals mentioned are°:

Analyst: <http://www.shef.ac.uk/uni/academic>

[/N-Q/phil/analysis/homepage.html](#)

Edited by Peter Smith (Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, UK).

Psyche: <http://www.phil.vt.edu/ASSC/>

The official journal of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Its editors are° Patrick Wilken and Kevin Korb (Department of Computer Sciences, Monash University, Victoria, Australia).

Etica e politica: http://www.univ.trieste.it/~dipfilo/etica_e_politica/

the electronic journal of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Trieste.

Epistemologia: <http://www.tilgher.it/epistemologia.html>

Epistemologia e logica / Philosophy of Science & Logic: <http://www.univ.trieste.it/~dipfilo/episteme/>

Protosociology: <http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/protosociology>

☞ **THE MONIST CALL FOR PAPERS**

Art and the Mind 86:4 October 2003

Deadline for submissions: October 31, 2002

Advisory Editors: N. J. Bullot and P. Ludwig (CREA, Paris). E-mail:

ludwig@poly.polytechnique.fr

Works of art are cognitive devices aimed at the production of rich cognitive effects. Thus it can be argued, in the light of what is known about human cognition, that aesthetic experience is a by-product of the exercise of more fundamental cognitive faculties such as perception and imagination. Works of art, on this view, are never grasped directly. Rather, in an aesthetic experience, a subject directly perceives a certain object or event (a canvas, a display of pixels, a series of sounds), and this perception gives rise to a cognitive activity of a special, aesthetic type. Theories of art should thus address questions about the interplay of the cognitive faculties. Papers are invited on all aspects of the relation between perception, imagination, the emotions, and aesthetic experience, and on the way in which findings in cognitive science can shed new light on art, its appreciation, and its evaluation.

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PHILOSOPHY ON THE NET

☞ **ESAP HOMEPAGE**

<http://www.dif.unige.it/esap/index.html>

☞ **AUSTRIAN SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY**

<http://info.uibk.ac.at/sci-org/oegp/>

☞ **GAP HOMEPAGE**

<http://gwdu19.gwdg.de/~gap>

☞ **PPP - POLISH PHILOSOPHY PAGE**

<http://www.fmag.unict.it/polhome.html>

☞ **SEFA HOMEPAGE**

<http://fs-morente.filos.ucm.es/sefa/sefa.htm>

☞ **SIFA HOMEPAGE**

<http://www.vc.unipmn.it/~sifa/sifa.htm>

with a new page on Philosophical Events in Analytic Philosophy in Europe, edited by Sebastiano Moruzzi:

<http://sifa.vc.unipmn.it/2eve/con.htm>

☞ **SOPHA HOMEPAGE**

<http://www.polytechnique.fr/laboratoires/crea/F/sopha/index.htm>

☞ **SPF (Sociedade Portuguesa de Filosofia) HOMEPAGE**

<http://www.terravista.pt/Mussulo/8898/>

☞ **SPANISH SOCIETY FOR LOGIC, METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN SPAIN**

fs-morente.filos.ucm.es/sociedad/sociedad.htm
or http://www.ucm.es/facultad_filosofia/sociedad

☞ **AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION**

www.udel.edu/apa

☞ **ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC**

<http://www.math.uiuc.edu/~asl/>

☞ **INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS^o**

<http://www.cep.unt.edu/ISSE.html>

PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARIES AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS ONLINE

☞ **ENCICLOPEDIA DE TERMOS LÓGICO-FILOSÓFICOS**

<http://bd1.bn.pt/enci/>

☞ **GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY ON THE INTERNET**

Fall 1996: Robert L. Causey:
<http://www.earlham.edu/suber/philinks.htm>

☞ **NOESIS: PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH ON-LINE**

Noesis is a new search engine dedicated to philosophy on the Internet. It employs new search routines that allow users to approach data from a variety of perspectives. In addition to a search engine, Noesis includes a browsable index, broken down into a separate author index and a collections index.
<http://ialab.evansville.edu/ei/pi/>

☞ **Philosophy pages from Garth Kemerling**

It provides assistance with the teaching of history of occidental philosophy. A dictionary of philosophical terms and names, a sketch of the history of occidental philosophy and a detailed discussion of the points of view of the most prominent philosophers are available.
<http://people.delphi.com/gkemerling/index.htm>

☞ **SWIF**

The SWIF has organised a new informative service on philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias. This service, which can be consulted at <http://lgxserver.uniba.it/lei/dionari/dizengl.htm>, provides a critical selection of links to various encyclopedias and dictionaries of philosophy and other reference materials that may be of interest to philosophers.
<http://lgxserver.uniba.it/lei/>

☞ **THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PHILOSOPHY PROJECT**

Fall 1996: Robert L. Causey:
<http://csmaclab-www.uchicago.edu/philosophyProject/philos.html>

☞ **A FIELD GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND**

General Editors: Marco Nani & Massimo Marraffa

Philosophy of mind and the philosophical issues arising in the allied domain of cognitive sciences constitute a fast developing territory, which is very well introduced by a number of excellent web resources (see our choice at RECOMMENDED LINKS section). In the hope not just to follow the stream, but to be interestingly complementary to them, more focused views of specific regions will be supplied here. We call them GUIDED TOURS, each being an in depth exploration of a particular topic that comprises two parts: 1) a preliminary state-of-the-art report on the issue, which explains what the question is, how it arises and what ramifications result from it; how the debate goes on with all the theories, objections, proposed solutions, etc. 2) a bibliographical guide to the relevant literature, which consists of copiously annotated items. Such a bibliography does not aim at an abstract completeness, but it should reasonably cover all the material worth mentioning, or at least what so seems in the opinion of the author. As it is in the field guide genre, the reader is provided with helpful signposts by experienced authors, but is encouraged to eventually take his own path. In the continuous effort of enlarging and keeping them updated, the tours will be always in progress.°

Annotated items can be individually searched in the DATABASE section, where they are listed by AUTHORS and by TITLES.

<http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/>