
EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

NEWSLETTER N° 22

The bulletin is issued thrice per year by the end of February, June, and November. If you wish to let us know about activities you or your department are planning (conferences, seminars, workshops, and the like) or about important philosophical events that have recently taken place, please contact either your national correspondent or the newsletter editor, Jiri Benovsky (jiri.benovsky@unifr.ch). Please note ESAP's new website: <http://www.dif.unige.it/esap>

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CALLS FOR PAPERS :

Deadline for submissions to "FOL75" is March 31, 2003.

Please visit <http://www.fol75.philog.ruc.dk/fol75cpapers.html> for information on how to submit a paper.

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Call for papers and reviews

The journal "Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse"

We are presently accepting papers and reviews for the seventh annual volume (Jan.2004), which will concentrate on the following topic: Volume 7 "History of Philosophy of Nature".

The deadline for papers is. 30 June 2003. Furthermore, papers and reviews concerning the classics throughout the History of Philosophy are welcome at any time. The languages of publication are English and German. Papers must be submitted together with an electronic version. Electronic versions may be sent to us as attachment by e-mail. Each paper should also begin with a short abstract. More information about former issues: <http://www.uni-bonn.de/pla>
Please send papers to

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Please send reviews to /Rezensionen bitte senden an:

Dr. Wolfgang Malzkorn, Universität Bonn (wmalzkorn@owc.com)

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II meetings on pragmatism

II encuentros sobre pragmatismo

Hilary Putnam's pragmatism

El pragmatismo de Hilary Putnam

May 13th -14th, 2004

13-14 de Mayo de 2004

Santiago de Compostela

Invited Speakers: H. Putnam (Harvard University), C. Hookway (Sheffield University)

These Meetings are organized by the *Área de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela* and promoted by the current attendants of the *Coloquio Compostelano de Lógica y Filosofía Analítica* and counts with the support of the *Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica* (SEFA) and of the *Sociedad de Logica, Metodología y*

Filosofía de la Ciencia en España (SLMFCE).

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE: M^a Uxía Rivas Monroy (Univ. Santiago de Compostela), Concepción Martínez Vidal (Univ. Santiago de Compostela), Celeste Cancela (Univ. Santiago de Compostela).

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE : Juan José Acero (Univ. de Granada), Christopher Hookway (Sheffield Univ.), Jaime Nubiola (Univ. de Navarra), Eulalia Pérez Sedeño (Instituto de Filosofía, CSIC), Hilary Putnam (Harvard Univ.), Juan Vázquez Sánchez (Univ. Santiago de Compostela).

The MEETINGS ON PRAGMATISM series of conferences aim at providing a forum for the presentation and discussion of current research in all aspects of pragmatism with the special purpose of getting Spanish Philosophers interested in Pragmatism to know each other better and, mainly, to provide a forum to discuss the latest developments in the field.

The II MEETING ON PRAGMATISM will be devoted to Hilary Putnam, one of the acknowledged exponents of the renaissance of pragmatism in our time. The speakers invited to participate in the II Meetings on Pragmatism, devoted to the author of the classic in the field *Reason, Truth and History*, will be Hilary Putnam himself and Christopher Hookway.

Hilary Putnam is one of the most important contemporary authors in analytic philosophy. His long and disturbing philosophical activity characterises by, among other things, proposing important and defying thesis that have raised many fruitful debates in almost all areas of philosophy. Though it is possible to distinguish three periods in his philosophical evolution, the purpose of this second meeting will be to analyse and discuss the main ideas and aspects in his last period, since it is this last part of his thought the one in which his pragmatist inclination is best featured.

The main areas in which it is interesting to underline Putnam's pragmatism are the following: a) realism, b) relativism, c) dichotomy fact/value, d) inheritance of pragmatism in Putnam's thought, e) theory of perception, f) theory of meaning, g) pragmatist conception of truth.

Hilary Putnam was born in Chicago in 1927; at the moment he is Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University. His large production includes, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge University Press, 1981), *The Many Faces of Realism* (The Carus Lectures in 1986, published by Open Court in 1987), *Realism with a Human Face* (Harvard University Press, 1990), *Renewing Philosophy* (Harvard University Press, 1992), *Pragmatism: an Open Question* (Blackwell, 1994), *The Threefold Cord; Mind, Body and World* (Columbia University Press, 1999), *The Collapse of the Fact / Value Dichotomy* (Cambridge, 2002).

STRUCTURE OF THE CONFERENCE AND CONDITIONS ON ABSTRACTS

Because the meeting emphasises the pragmatist orientation in Putnam's thought, the invited conferences (and also the contributions) will deal with that aspect in Putnam's work. There will be two invited conferences.

The II Meetings on Pragmatism has been conceived as a meeting where actual discussion of both contributed papers and invited conferences should play a main role. Hence,

- i) The lectures will be followed by a 30-minutes discussion in charge of an invited discussant, and by a debate.
- ii) There will be no parallel sessions and contributed papers will be allowed a longer time for presentation than usual.

We ask for contributions in English that will count on 35-40 minutes for presentation and will be followed by a debate period lasting 25-20 minutes. A four pages abstract should be

submitted by January 31st 2004. Contributions will be (blindly) informed. The evaluation criteria will be quality and emphasis on the author's pragmatist dimension (whatever the area of Putnam's work be the central topic of the contributed paper).

Please indicate separately (to facilitate blind refereeing) the name of the author/s, postal address, affiliation, phone number and e-mail .

DEADLINE FOR CONTRIBUTIONS: January 31st 2004

COMMUNICATION OF ACCEPTANCE: April 15th, 2004

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE : English

Contributed papers should be sent by e-mail in an attached file in pdf, RTF or Word format to

Celeste Cancela Silva: mceleste@usc.es;

Concepción Martínez Vidal: lflpcmav@usc.es;

M^a Uxía Rivas Monroy: lfuxia@usc.es,

or by ordinary mail to the following address:

Dpto. de Lógica y filosofía moral

Facultad de Filosofía

Campus Universitario Sur

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Spain

The organisation will pay for the accommodation of the authors of accepted contributions. Financial availability permitting, the organisation will also cover meals expenditures. No other expenditures will be covered.

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European society for philosophy and psychology

Preliminary call for papers for the 2003 annual meeting Torino, Italy, 9-12 july 2003

The aim of the Society is "to promote interaction between philosophers and psychologists on issues of common concern".

Psychologists, neuroscientists, linguists, computer scientists and biologists are encouraged to report experimental, theoretical and clinical work that they judge to have philosophical significance; and philosophers are encouraged to engage with the fundamental issues addressed by and arising out of such work. In recent years ESPP sessions have covered such topics as spatial concepts, simulation theory, attention, reference, problems of consciousness, emotion, perception, early numerical cognition, infants' understanding of intentionality, memory and time, motor imagery, counterfactuals, the semantics/pragmatics distinction, reasoning, vagueness, mental causation, action and agency, thought without language, externalism, connectionism, hypnotism, and the interpretation of neuropsychological results.

Invited Speakers

Axel Cleeremans, Brussels University

Robert Stalnaker, MIT

Deirdre Wilson, UCL

Richard Wollheim, Berkeley

Confirmed Invited Symposia include:

JOINT ATTENTION convened by Johannes Roessler, Warwick

EMOTIONAL REASON convened by Sabine Doering, Essen & Thomas Goschke, Dresden

MINIMALISM IN LINGUISTICS convened by David Adger, QMW London

SELF-REPORT & INTROSPECTION convened by Alvin Goldman, Rutgers

The Society invites submitted papers and posters for this meeting. Submitted papers are refereed and selected on the basis of quality and relevance to psychologists, philosophers and linguists. Papers should not exceed a length of 20 minutes (about 8 double-spaced pages) for a total 30 minute session.

Submissions may be by abstract but in the case of philosophical submissions a full paper is preferred.

This year the Society encourages submission of symposia topics - the convenor should submit a brief (1000 word) description of the symposium topic together with the names of suggested participants (a symposium is expected to contain 3 or a maximum of 4 speakers in distinct fields). Potential convenors should email the description and list of speakers directly to one of the programme chairs by 28 February 2003.

There will also be poster presentations.

A submission for a poster presentation should consist of a 500-word abstract. Submitted papers may also be considered for presentation as posters.

THE DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF SYMPOSIA TOPICS is 28 FEBRUARY, 2003

Successful applications will be asked to confirm speakers for their session by 7 MAY 2003.

THE DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSIONS OF PAPERS AND POSTERS is 30 APRIL, 2003.

Please send an electronic version (in PDF, PS or MS Word format) to any ONE of the programme chairs.

Submission of applications can also be made by online submission at

<http://www.eurospp.org/2003/submission.html>

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CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Logic of Time and Modality

Roskilde University, Friday, October 31 - Saturday, November 1, 2003

Arthur Norman Prior (1914-69) was the founding father of the modern logic of time and modality. In the 1950s and 1960s he laid out the foundation of temporal logic and showed that this discipline was intimately connected with modal logic. Since then, temporal and modal logic has grown into a mature discipline with many important applications in philosophy, computer science, and also linguistics.

One characteristic of Prior's work is the point of view that logic should be related as closely as possible to intuitions embodied in everyday discourse. He also argued that temporal logic is fundamental for understanding and describing the world in which we live. An important contribution by Prior was the foundation of what is now known as hybrid logics. One simple form of a hybrid logic is a temporal logic in which a special sort of formulas called instant-propositions can be used to refer to specific instants in a model. Thereby further expressive power is obtained. Hybrid logics are closely related to the so-called description logics used for knowledge representation in computer science. Prior's work on hybrid logic was motivated by a philosophical debate regarding two different conceptions of time: The *A*-series and *B*-series conceptions of time. The *A*-series conception is based on the notions of past, present, and future, as opposed to a 'tapestry' view on time, as embodied by the *B*-series conception of time according to which time is just a set of instants ordered with an earlier-later relation. Prior considered the *A*-conception to be the fundamental one and in his view, the *B*-concepts can be defined in terms of the *A*-concepts using instant-propositions. Branching time logic is another important contribution by Prior. Using this temporal logic, he analysed the fundamental philosophical question of determinism versus freedom of choice. In this analysis Prior demonstrated that it is possible to interpret the general idea of branching time in several fundamentally different ways.

There is still a lot to learn from Prior's writings, indeed, Oxford University Press has recently published a revised and enlarged edition of Prior's last book, *Papers on Time and Tense*. Since Prior's foundational work on the logic of time and modality, this discipline has attracted ever more attention not only within logic, but also within computer science, formal linguistics and philosophy in general. It is the aim of the conference at Roskilde University to discuss the modern challenges, problems, and applications of the Priorean approach to the logic of time and modality.

The conference is directed at researchers as well as graduate and PhD students in the fields of philosophical, computational, and mathematical logic.

MORE INFORMATION : <http://www.philog.ruc.dk/phiconf3.html>

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Conference FOL75 - Celebrating 75 Years of First Order Logic

September 18-21, 2003

Berlin (DE)

<http://www.fol75.philog.ruc.dk>

INVITED SPEAKERS: Hajnal Andreka (Hungary), George Englebretsen (Canada), William Ewald (USA), Jeroen Groenendijk (The Netherlands), Petr Hajek (Czech Republic), Jaakko Hintikka (USA), Wilfrid Hodges (Great Britain), István Németi (Hungary), Alan Robinson (USA), Dana Scott (USA), Martin Stokhof (The Netherlands), Valentin Shehtman (Russia)

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Uwe Scheffler

Dept. of Philosophy, Humboldt University, DE

Heinrich Wansing

Institute of Philosophy, Dresden University of Technology, DE

CALL FOR PAPERS:

Contributions to FOL75 are invited in the form of papers according to the following areas related to FOL: FOL and the History of Logic; Extensions of and Alternatives to FOL; Cognition and Knowledge Representation; The Unity of Logic and FOL as the lingua franca of the Formal Sciences; FOL and Ontology, FOL and Natural Language Semantics

Anonymous submissions in terms of extended abstracts of up to 10 pages (sent preferably in postscript format by e-mail to Prof. Uwe Scheffler, fol75@philosophie.hu-berlin.de, with the subject line "Submission FOL75" accompanied by a covering letter with name and address of author(s)) must be received by March 31, 2003. The abstracts must be written in English and give enough detail to allow the program committee to assess the merits of the work. The abstracts should start with a brief statement of the issues, a summary of the main results, and a statement of their significance and relevance to the conference. References and comparisons with related work is also expected. Results must be unpublished and not submitted for publication elsewhere, including the proceedings of other symposia, workshops or conferences. One author of each accepted paper will be expected to attend the conference in order to present it. Authors will be notified of acceptance by May 31, 2003, and final versions (in LaTeX2e format) will be due by November 30, 2003. Authors of accepted papers will be asked to send a short abstract of two pages for the conference booklet. The full invited and accepted contributed papers will appear in a proceedings published by Logos Verlag in Berlin.

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Conference "50 Years of Studia Logica"

November 20-22, 2003

Carlsberg Academy (DK)

<http://www.50yrs.philog.ruc.dk>

Year 2003 marks the 50th Anniversary of Studia Logica - An International Journal for Symbolic Logic. PHILOG in association with Studia Logica pay tribute to this Anniversary event by hosting the second of two conferences entitled 50 Years of Studia Logica - Trends in Logic. Studia Logica has for the past 50 years been one of the leading journals in symbolic logic. The journal covers contemporary formal logic and its applications and relations to other disciplines. These include artificial intelligence, informatics, cognitive science, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of language. However this list is not exhaustive, moreover, the range of applications, comparisons and sources of inspiration is open and evolves over time.

The journal is also serving as an important East-West link.

The aim of the conference is to bring together scholars in the fields of philosophy, logic, mathematics, and computer science and other disciplines who have contributed significantly to what Studia Logica is today. The conference will include lectures by distinguished scholars covering topics within the aim and scope of the journal.

INVITED SPEAKERS:

Johan van Benthem (Holland)

Wojciech Buszkowski (Poland)

Leo Esakia (Georgia)

Melvin Fitting (USA)

Joseph M. Font (Spain)

Robert Goldblatt (New Zealand)

Daniele Mundici (Italy)

Hiroakira Ono (Japan)

Heinrich Wansing (Germany)

ORGANIZATION :

The organizational committee of the Conference consists of:

Vincent F. Hendricks, Department of Philosophy and Science Studies, Roskilde University, Denmark: vincent@ruc.dk

Jacek Malinowski, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland: jacekm@cc.uni.torun.pl

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REGISTRATION

Registration is free. Please write the PHILOG secretary PELLE GULDBORG HANSEN at pgh@ruc.dk or use the following mailing address:

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Phone (+45) 4674 2540 / (+45) 2334 2175

Fax: (+45) 4674 3012

Email: pgh@ruc.dk

Please be sure to include your name, institution, country and zip-code and your email address. If

email is used include "50 YEARS - DK" in the subject entry. All questions pertaining to registration, accommodations and transportation should be directed to Pelle Guldborg Hansen. No individual notification upon registration will be forwarded to individual participants. However, a list of registered participants will be posted on this page. Registered participants will receive the full program electronically.

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Visiting professor in Barcelona, Spain, Jerrold Levinson (University of Maryland)
11th June 2003

Facultad de Humanidades
Universidad Pompeu Fabra

He will give the following talk: "**Aristotle's Poetics: some answers to Plato's complaints about dramatic art**"

For any further information, please contact prof. Montserrat Bordes,
Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain.

Tel.: 93 542 26 59, fax: 93 542 16 20, e-mail: montserrat.bordes@huma.upf.es.

SEMINAR AND WORKSHOP PROGRAMMES

Third Barcelona workshop on issues in the theory of reference

Special topic: general terms

Dates: 5-7 (Thursday-Saturday) June, 2003.

Invited speakers:

Mark Johnston (Princeton)

Stephen Yablo (MIT)

Crispin Wright (St. Andrews)

Organized by: LOGOS -- Grup de Recerca en Lògica, Llenguatge i Cognició / Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group

Organizing committee: Gemma Celestino, Manuel García-Carpintero, Josep Macià, Genoveva Martí.

Further information: for further information please check the conference website at http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/bw3 or write to logos@pcb.ub.es

Saul Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* and Hillary Putnam's "The Meaning of Meaning" pointed out important similarities between proper names and some general terms such as "tiger", "chunk of gold", "gold", "water", "iron pyrites", "light" and "lightning". This third edition of the Barcelona Workshop will be devoted to the study of the semantics of natural kind terms and other general terms. Some questions to be addressed are: What do terms such as "cat", "lightning", "chunk of gold" and "gold" have in common? What sort of entities do they denote? What distinguishes them, if anything, from other general terms such as "red", "chair" or "pediatrician"? What is the significance of the count/mass distinction for our understanding of the semantics of these terms? Mark Johnston's "Manifest Kinds" (1997) and Scott Soames' *Beyond Rigidity* (2001) are instances of important recent work on the topic of the Workshop.

Speakers:

Hagit Benbaji, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel,

"Varieties of the Manifest"

Mario Gomez-Torrente, ICREA & Universitat de Barcelona, Spain

"Essentialist Predicates and General Term Rigidity"

Jussi Haukioja, University of Turku, Finland

"Rigidity, General Terms, and Recognitional Capacities"

Mark Johnston, Princeton, USA

TBA

Dan López de Sa, Universitat de Barcelona, Spain

"Predicates Rigidly Signifying the "Unnatural""

Adèle Mercier, Queen's University, Canada

"A Striking Case of Difference Between Kinds of Kind Terms"

Marc A. Moffet, University of Colorado, USA

"Knowledge Attributions as Generic Sentences"

Martine Nida-Ruemelin, University of Fribourg, Switzerland

"Phenomenal Essentialism: A Problem for Identity Theories"

Antonio Rauti, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA
"Compositionality and Predicates"
Benjamin Schnieder, University of Hamburg, Germany
"Talking About Properties"
Scott Soames, Princeton University, USA
"Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds"
Arthur Sullivan, NYU, USA
"Rigidity and Predicates"
Joan Weiner, Indiana University, USA
"Science and Semantics: the Case of Vagueness"
Crispin Wright, University of St. Andrews, UK
"Predication and Quantifying into Predicate Position"

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10th Italo-Spanish meeting for analytic philosophy will be held in Pamplona, Spain, 6-8 november 2003
Further information at <http://sophia.unav.es/~cerezo/Coloquio/index.html>

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Osnabrueck Cognitive Science Doctorate Programme

New Applications by 1 April, 2003

The University of Osnabrueck is running one of the largest Cognitive Science programmes and the only one in Germany that offers courses for the Bachelor, Master, and Doctorate degrees. Cognitive Science in Osnabrueck involves the following subjects:

- Artificial Intelligence
- (Computational) Linguistics
- Cognitive Psychology
- Neuroinformatics
- Neurobiopsychology
- Philosophy of Cognition

For the new academic year starting in October 2003, we seek up to five excellent students to join the Cognitive Science Doctorate Programme. The Doctorate Programme is a three-year international curricular programme for the degree of a Dr.phil. or Dr.rer.nat. and is supported by the DAAD. The focus of research is on cognitive architectures and the integration of pattern-based and rule-based mechanisms.

Admission to the Doctorate Programme requires a Master's degree or equivalent in either Cognitive Science or one of the above subdisciplines, plus undergraduate-level knowledge of at least one other area of Cognitive Science. There is an option for an integrated Master's and Doctorate study. Application deadline is 1 April, 2003

For details please take a look at www.cogsci.uos.de/en/DoctorateProgramme.html.

REPORTS

Report of the 1st Spanish-Portuguese meeting in analytic philosophy

From the 20th to the 22nd of November 2002 there took place in Santiago de Compostela the First Spanish-Portuguese Meeting in Analytic Philosophy, started with the purpose of promoting and intensifying scientific exchange between Spanish and Portuguese researchers who develop their work within the field of Analytic Philosophy. The sessions began with the conference entitled “Usted no es quien para darme órdenes: Fuerza ilocucionaria y condiciones ilocucionarias” (“You are nobody to order over me: Illocutionary force and illocutionary conditions”), by Dr. Antonio Blanco Salgueiro (Universidad Complutense de Madrid). His contribution made a defence of an antimentalist externism, akin to the one maintained by J. L. Austin, with respect to illocutionary force. A. Blanco proceeded by establishing an analogy between semantic externism, concerning representational content, and illocutionary externism, related to force. Just as H. Putnam y T. Burge affirm that both the truth value and the truth conditions of utterances are determined by a given physical and social environment, from the second type of externism it could be argued that both force and illocutionary conditions are determined by such environment. Thus, the two kinds of conditions would coincide in being rigidly linked to a given physical and social environment. In the case of orders, the one analysed in the talk, the insufficiency of utterer’s intentions to get something to count as a command is emphasised. By contrast, external factors, not reducible to the ones present within the emission context, as for example, the institutional acknowledgement of legitimate authority over the person who received the order, are taken into account.

Dr. Ricardo Santos (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), in his conference, “O problema do significado na teoria da verdade de Tarski”, addressed the controversy aforesaid in the title (“The meaning problem within Tarski’s theory of truth”). He focused on the interrelation between the concepts of truth and meaning in A. Tarski’s theory, analysing, first, the conflict between D. Davidson’s suggestion of regarding truth as a primitive concept and Tarski’s claim to have defined such concept without resort to any primitive semantic term. Second, R. Santos gave an account of the semantic problems that precluded Tarski from accomplishing his goal in a philosophically satisfactory way. Three of them were under discussion: the enumerative character of his definition of truth, the necessary relativization of the latter to some particular language, and, finally, the tautological character of T-sentences that derive from such definition. Dr. Santos agrees with H. Putnam, H. Field and D. Davidson, among others, about the requirement of making the definition of truth relative to any language. Since Tarski’s definition did not satisfy the former requirement, he believes it convenient to reconsider the acceptance of truth as an indefinable concept.

Dr. Manuel Pérez Otero (Universidad de Barcelona), gave a talk entitled “Impresiones de contingencia y dualismo psicofísico según Kripke” (“Contingency impressions and psychophysical dualism according to Kripke”). His intervention aimed at refuting a Kripkean argument in favour of the dualism between mind and brain. Nevertheless, M. Pérez Otero argument explicitly assumes the general philosophical framework proposed by Kripke. Taking into consideration that Kripkean dualistic theses rest on his explication of those contingency impressions provoked by certain necessary truths, M. Pérez Otero did not criticise Kripke’s metaphysic and semantic theses but his way of arguing. In particular, the explicative irrelevancy of a crucial aspect, which is essentially employed in Kripke’s defence of dualism, was shown. This aspect amounts to assuming the contingency of a sentence S’, epistemically equivalent to a sentence S as for qualitative features, being S necessary although apparently contingent, and

having been established an association between S and S' from the side of linguistic agents. Dr. Pérez Otero claimed that the explication of the aspect mentioned depends, in turn, on a more general one, not effective against psychophysical monism, explanation in which Kripke points at the confusion between necessity and apriority as the cause for appearance of contingency.

The second session of the Meeting started with the contribution by Dr. Sofia Miguens (Universidade do Porto), which was entitled "Agentes racionais e irracionais (quanta racionalidade é necessária na teoria da mente?)" ("Rational agents and irrational agents (how much rationality is necessary in the theory of language?"). The notion of rationality, as it is used in Cognitive Sciences, was discussed. In S. Miguens' view, both the necessity of the notion of rationality to undertake mind and cognitive questions, and the open problem about the nature of rationality, must be analysed. Seeking to go deeply into the latter issue, the talk began with a survey of D. Davidson's transcendentalist theory of rationality. Some failures of this theory were put forward with the help of the intentional and the minimalist conceptions of rationality provided by D. Dennett and C. Cherniak respectively. In her discussion, S. Miguens examined the philosophical consequences derived from the imperfection of rationality. Such imperfection was followed from Cherniak's theory of minimum rationality, but was hardly admitted by Dennett's theory of intentional systems, and denied in Davidson's idealising account of rationality (that appeals to the model of theory choice). Therefore the author confronted the Davidsonian conception of rationality, as a type of logic transcendently adequate, of a universal and aprioristic character, to Dennett's and Cherniak's proposals, both committed to a notion of rationality at the level of the agent. In accordance with these proposals, the agent is only required to show a reasonably substantial command of the set of inferences that would be demanded from a perfect rational agent by applying a given instrumental criterion.

Dr. Luis M. Peris-Viñé (Universidad de Granada) analysed the relation between the configuration of linguistic theories and the ontological commitments that they presuppose, that is, the kind of objects to which they are committed. Throughout his conference about "Ontología de teorías lingüísticas" ("Ontology of linguistic theories"), Leonard Bloomfield and Noam Chomsky ontological conceptions were critically reviewed. The talk specially focussed on two periods of their respective scientific productions. In the case of Bloomfield, the talk focussed on those corresponding to *An Introduction to the Study of Language* (1914) and *Language* (1933), and, in the case of Chomsky, on those corresponding to *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory* (1955) and *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965). L. M. Peris-Viñé questioned the usual interpretation of both authors' ontological positions, even the one offered by the authors themselves. The methodological tools employed to that end were the following: the conceptual analysis of texts, the interpretation of linguists' practice, and the logical-reconstructive analysis of theories. The conclusion drawn was that, contrary to what has been established from orthodox interpretations, it is not true that Bloomfield (1933), characterised by a nominalistic turn, defends Bloomfield's (1914) mentalism. Similarly, Peris-Viñé rejected the orthodox interpretations of Chomsky (1955), usually understood as sharing Chomsky's (1965) mentalist view, because in *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory* the thesis about externalised language, rather than the one about internalised language, is explicitly defended.

In his conference about "Inconmensurabilidad, percepción e informes observacionales" ("Incommensurability, perception and observational reports"), Dr. José Luis Falguera intended to elucidate whether the perceptual change, which according to T. S. Kuhn (*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962) takes place during revolutionary theory change, is an essential element for the thesis about intertheoretical incommensurability. Basing his analysis on Alexander Bird's study *Thomas Kuhn* (2000), J.L. Falguera described the way in which Kuhn justified such thesis. According to Dr. Falguera's reconstruction, Kuhn would have assumed

some perceptual postulates characteristic of standard logical empiricism, for instance, the identification of observation with conscious perceptual experience. On the other side, he would have refused some others, in particular, the idea that conscious perceptions supply direct information concerning the external world, which would be independent of any judgement. Dr. Falguera denounced that the mentioned identification constitutes a further dogma of empiricism. He opposed to it a noticeable distinction between observation and conscious perception. It would be specific of the former to include recognition according to a given conceptual apparatus, which implies asserting its conceptual character. A greater empirical relevance for science would be also ascribed to it. Hence, the relevant thing for incommensurability would not be changes in perceptual experience, but conceptual variance together with diverging reference. This would allow restricting the scope of the thesis about intertheoretical incommensurability to the linguistic-conceptual sphere, just as Kuhn proposed since 1976 (“Theory-Change as Structure-Change. Comments of the Sneed Formalism”).

The third and last session began with the intervention of Dr. Wenceslao J. González (Universidad de A Coruña), presented under the title: “El empirismo moderado en Filosofía Analítica: Una réplica a P. F. Strawson” (“Moderate empiricism in Analytic Philosophy: A reply to P. F. Strawson”). W. J. González focussed on the characterisation and the development of Strawson’s moderate empiricism. His conference unfolded the discussion held by both authors, which is accounted for in the papers “P. F. Strawson’s Moderate Empiricism: The Philosophical Basis of his Approach in Theory of Knowledge” (W. J. González, 1998) and “Reply to Wenceslao J. González” (P. F. Strawson, 1998). Dr. González emphasised the post-Kantian and non-reductionist character of Strawsonian empiricism. Furthermore, he explained the two elements he puts forward to improve Strawson’s account, namely, the regard to the historical dimension of concepts, and the need of keeping their objective nature. W. J. González concluded by commenting on Strawson’s response to such suggestions. A new distinction, accepted by Dr. González, between concept (intellectual possession of a thing’s property) and property (the universal, belonging to an extramental reality), was put forward by P. F. Strawson. In his conference about “Linguagem e pensamento” (“Language and thought”), Dr. António Zilhão (Universidade Nova de Lisboa) explored the relation between language and thought appealing to the fictitious case described in George Orwell’s novel entitled *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. This book told about a new language (‘Newspeak’) that had been designed to limit and to condition the sphere of thought (forcing through language its agreement with certain ideological principles). After regarding the criticism made by the psycholinguist Steven Pinker (*The Language Instinct*) against the thesis of linguistic determinism, which underlies the fictitious case referred, A. Zilhão chose an intermediate road between such determinism and the reductionism of thoughts to propositional contents. Even acknowledging the symbolic nature of thought mechanisms, Zilhão discussed whether the latter have semantic control over the public language.

Within the field of Practical Philosophy, Dr. Pedro Galvão (Universidade Nova de Lisboa) presented his contribution: “Duplo Efeito: O problema da proximidade” (“Double Effect: The problem of proximity”). There he defended the double effect doctrine (D.D.E.), which is applicable to those situations where the agent foresees that behaving in a certain way will yield at least one good effect (intended) and one bad effect (merely foreseen, not intended). The problem of the characterisation, not only of intentions but also of the agent’s surrounding, gave rise to another one, namely, the problem of distinguishing the intended good action from its foreseen bad effect, justifying at the same time the necessary connection between both of them. This problem has been called ‘the problem of proximity’. To solve it, the author appealed to a notion of proximity that is close to the one supplied by Michael Bratman, and which is

understood as dependency between facts, being such dependency established by virtue of the equality of relevant dispositions required to intend those facts. Dr. Galvão claimed, thus, the relevancy of the distinction between that which is thought as means and that which is expectable from the means employed, thereby he rejects the main objections against D.D.E., which were grounded on a supposed artificiality of the preceding distinction.

The Meeting also included numerous communications, in which the next subjects were discussed: the cognitive usage of language revealed by introspection (Agustín Vicente, Universidad de Valladolid), the ambiguity of the semantic notion of indicating in Frege (Luis Villegas Forero, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela), conceptual relativism and empiricism (Celeste Cancela, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela), the relation between language and thought (André Joffily Abath, Universidad Nova de Lisboa), the duty of veracity (Txetxu Ausín, Universidad Europea de Madrid, y Lorenzo Peña, C.S.I.C.), the thesis about occasional identity (Marta Campdelacreu Argues, Universidad de Barcelona), Shoemaker-Woods debate on self-identification (José María Ariso, Universidad Complutense de Madrid), the theory of simulation ((Tamara Ojeda Arceo, Universidad de la Laguna), *a priori* empirical knowledge (Javier Vilanova, Universidad Complutense de Madrid), naturalism and aprioricity (Concha Martínez Vidal, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela), cognitive neuroscience as interpretative science (Juan José Acero y Alberto Morales, Universidad de Granada), communication and intentionality (Paulo Barroso, Universidad Nova de Lisboa), referential changes of natural kind terms in science (María de la Concepción Caamaño Alegre, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela), and, finally, specialisation and incommensurability (Carlos Calviño Barreiro, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela).

María de la Concepción Caamaño Alegre (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela)

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Report of the IX Italo-Spanish Meeting of Analytic Philosophy

29th - 30th November 2002

Padova

During the last week of November the very “bella citá” of Padova, Italy, held the IX Italo-Spanish Meeting of Analytic Philosophy. The meeting was organised by the two Societies of Analytic Philosophy (Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica -SEFA- and Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica -SIFA-) and the Department of Philosophy of the University of Padova. Its aim is to promote the interchange of current production of the analytic philosophy within both countries. As usual in this Meeting, it was structured in some conferences, each of them was discussed by a philosopher of a different nationality from the reader of the paper. In total, there were eight lectures which offer a general perspective of some issues that are being researched in the analytic philosophy of Italy and Spain.

Propositions, Truth-Functions and Pictures in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was the opening lecture of the Meeting, it was given by María Cerezo (University of Navarre). Wittgenstein's attempt was to give an account of the proposition as a *truth-function* and as a *picture* so as to account for its truth and its signification, respectively. In the paper, the question whether the combination of the two theories was successful is addressed. By focussing on the ambiguity of the tractarian notion of *elementary proposition*, María Cerezo tries to show where

the internal conflict between the truth-functions theory and the picture theory lies. The difficulty arises as a consequence of the twofold role that the notion of elementary proposition is required to play. The proper place for this notion to appear is the theory of truth-functions, where elementary propositions are postulated as the first bases from which all the truth-functions can be constructed. However, Wittgenstein is obliged to invoke the notion of elementary proposition in the context of the picture theory as well. This displacement brings about an internal conflict between the two theories. Finally, based on some texts in the *Tractatus*, in particular T 4.221, María Cerezo also defends the idea that Wittgenstein was somehow aware of this internal difficulty.

This lecture was discussed by Guido Bonino (University of Torino).

The following lecture was *Darwinian Modules: a Moderate Defence of Evolutionary Psychology*, it was presented by Cristina Meini (University of Piemonte Orientale). Cristina Meini's paper concerns the epistemological status of evolutionary psychology. She discusses Fodor's conditional statement: "If cognitive systems were massively modular, then evolutionary psychology would not only be legitimate, but also very fruitful". She argues, counter to Fodor, that 1) there could be central Fodorian modules (i.e. domain specific and encapsulated cognitive systems) and 2) even if there are not central Fodorian modules, Fodor's argument is not conclusive. In each case, evolutionary psychology turns out to be very useful as an heuristic tool to study human mind.

Toni Gomila (University of Balears Islands) was the discussant of the last lecture.

Ekai Txapartegi (University of Basque Country) presented his lecture titled *Color Are not Surface Spectral Reflectances*. Ekai Txapartegi put forward the following thesis: a more comprehensive approach than physicalism is required to unify the plurality of disconnected phenomena related with colour vision. As a plausible alternative to physicalism, he defended that colours are relational properties. This position was presented as a variant of the classical Representational approach.

The Ekai Txapartegi's discussant was Simone Gozzano (University of L'Aquila).

The last lecture of the first day was *Type-Level Causation, Token-Level Causation and Causal Inference* given by Margherita Benzi (University of Genova). Does generic probabilistic causation depend on singular probabilistic causation? Are singular causal facts basic? Margherita Benzi examines some arguments for the primacy of singular causal facts (Cartwright 1989, 1995) and against it (Eells 1991, 1995) and argues in favour of the autonomy of the generic probabilistic causation from singular facts. Margherita Benzi then considers if the autonomy of generic causation implies that we must search for separate theories of causal reasoning, and concludes that although the two kinds of problems require different strategies, they don't require different formal theories.

Esa Díaz (University of Murcia / University of Sheffield) was the discussant of the Margherita Benzi's paper.

The lectures of the second and last day of the Meeting were the following:

The Game Theoretic Logic of Scientific Discovery, it was presented by Jesús Zamora Bonilla (National Distance University of Spain). Since scientists are involved in mutual interdependencies, game theory is an appropriate tool to understand their behaviour. Methodological norms are seen as a constitutional agreement which establishes the rules of the game scientists play. Some norms regulate the production of basic statements, for which an auction model is proposed. On the other hand, when the norms do not make it absolutely compulsory the acceptance of a scientific fact, scientists will choose strategically the facts they accept. It is argued that, under this game theoretic perspective, a conception of scientific knowledge emerges which is less relativistic than that of social constructivism.

Jesús Zamora Bonilla's discussant was Mauro Dorato (University of Roma).

The following lecture was *Emergence, Causality and Mind* by Michele Di Francesco (University of Piemonte Orientale). In his talk Michele Di Francesco tries to answer the following questions: 1. Is emergentism a *possible* solution to the problem of mental causation? 2. Is emergentism a *good* solution? (is it better than reductionism, or substance dualism?) 3. *In which way* should we understand emergentism in order to consider it a good solution? The author claims that emergentism may contribute to a sound analysis of *causal pluralism* and that causal pluralism *is* a valuable alternative to reductionism. But Michele Di Francesco also claims that the emergence of (intentional) mental properties from physical (and social) reality raises special difficulties, and that it is not clear whether these difficulties can be solved without endorsing a radical dualistic attitude towards the relation between mind and word.

The discussants of this lecture were Agustín Vicente (University of Valladolid) and Celeste Cancela (University of Santiago de Compostela).

Anomalous Monism: Oscillating between Dogmas was the lecture presented by Manuel de Pinedo (University of Granada). Manuel de Pinedo in his paper argues that there is an inconsistency between Davidson's anomalous monism and his rejection of the scheme/content dualism. If every mental event is a physical event, but there are no nomic links between the physical and the mental and no separation is possible between concepts and empirical contents or between world-views and reality, mental-physical token identities are doomed to be noumenal. Manuel de Pinedo suggests rejecting the second premise of Davidson's argument for anomalous monism (the nomological character of causality) and offers a sketch of an alternative conception of causality which makes it dependent on the notion of explanation.

Manuel de Pinedo's discussant was Massimiliano Carrara (University of Padova).

The closing lecture was *On the Usefulness of Semantic Concepts* given by Paolo Casalegno (University of Milano). In 'New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind' and elsewhere, Chomsky claims that the notion of reference, in the philosophers' sense, (i) does not belong to the conceptual system of common sense; (ii) has no role to play in a scientific study of language. Chomsky's arguments for thesis (ii) are, if not conclusive, quite strong. By contrast, thesis (i) seems to me to be clearly false. In his paper Paolo Casalegno discusses and criticises the following four arguments for (i) put forward by Chomsky: (a) in ordinary speech the words 'reference' and 'refer' have a meaning completely different from the meaning attributed to them by philosophers; (b) we cannot say that a term like 'water' refers to a specific substance because it is consciously used to speak of samples of substances whose nature varies greatly from occasion to occasion; (c) we cannot say that 'London' refers to London because the identity criteria for London are so ill-defined that even common sense must acknowledge that London does not exist; (d) the possession of the notion of reference in the philosophers' sense is not presupposed by semantic deference and by the social division of linguistic labour.

Javier Vidal (University of Navarre) and Pablo Cobreros (University of Navarre) were the discussants of the Paolo Casalegno's lecture.

One of the goals of these meetings is to promote the contacts between analytic philosophers of both countries. Each lecture, together with its correspondent comment, was followed by a fruitful discussion thanks to the friendly atmosphere among the participants.

Finally we would like to thank to the Department of Philosophy of the University of Padova for the splendid organization and diligence what was shown in every moment.

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Andrea Iacona, "Propositions", Name, Genoa 2002

A halo of mystery and distrust surrounds the word 'proposition' as it is currently used in philosophical discourse. Not only it is far from obvious what the word means, but it is not even obvious that some intelligible meaning can be attached to it. The present book is intended to put some order in this muddle. Its main purpose is to outline what the author takes to be the only sense in which the word 'proposition' can rightfully be used. A good part of the book is devoted to the examination of the arguments that seem to support the view that things such as propositions are to be "admitted" or "postulated", from the traditional ones to the more recent ones. The remaining part deals with the metaphysical issue of the existence and ontological status of propositions, and with related questions concerning truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes.

"This book is an excellent piece of work. It deals with a problem that is both well defined and rich in implications for other philosophical problems. The author defends - very effectively, I believe - a clearly defined claim, without ever losing sight of the main argument while successfully dealing with a number of side issues. The book is recommended for its quality, originality, and uniqueness of focus. As far as I know, no recently published book covers the same topic." *Diego Marconi*

Andrea Iacona is research fellow at the Università del Piemonte Orientale. He published several articles in *Philosophical Logic*, *Philosophy of Language*, and related topics.

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