
EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

NEWSLETTER N° 29

The bulletin is issued thrice per year by the end of February, June, and November. If you wish to let us know about activities you or your department are planning (conferences, seminars, workshops, and the like) or about important philosophical events that have recently taken place, please contact either your national correspondent or the newsletter editor, Jiri Benovsky (Jiri.Benovsky@unifr.ch). Please note ESAP's new website: <http://www.dif.unige.it/esap>

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CONTENT :

Conferences, seminars, summer schools, ...

- 3rd Barcelona-Milano Meeting for Analytic Philosophy p. 3
- Conference on Mental Processes : Inference and Representation p. 3
- Seminar on the Joint Doctorate Program Genoa-Barcelona p. 5
- 7th European Agent Systems Summer School p. 5
- European Society for Philosophy and Psychology 13th annual meeting p. 6
- Atelier : Logique et Choix Rationel p. 6
- Séminaire UCLA-IHPST p. 7
- 4th International Workshop on Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and applications p. 8
- Ecole Thématique : Esprit, Science, Métaphysique p. 11

Publications, journals

- Formal Philosophy p. 15
- Jaako Hintikka : Knowledge and Belief : An Introduction to the Logic of the two Notions p. 16
- PHINEWS p. 17

Past events

- Fine Philosophy – The Philosophy of Kit Fine p. 18
- The 1st Oxford-Budapest Conference p. 19
- The 3rd Bucarest Colloquium in Analytic Philosophy p. 20
- Dubrovnik Conference on Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Mind p. 21
- 2005 Axel Hägerström Lectures p. 23
- 2005 Pufendorf Lectures p. 23
- Epistemology and the Mind, a workshop on the Philosophy of A. Goldman ... p. 24

THIRD BARCELONA-MILANO MEETING FOR ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Milano, September 26-27, 2005.

The list of the talks:

Clotilde Calabi (Milano), "Joint Attention"

José Díez (Tarragona), "Conceptual Role and Conditional Beliefs"

Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (Barcelona), "Two-Dimensionalism and the Contingent A Priori"

Max Kölbel (Barcelona, Birmingham), "Assertion and Convention"

Josep Macià (Barcelona), "Knowledge of Reference and A Priori Knowledge"

Elisa Paganini (Milano), "Higher-order Vagueness"

Marco Santambrogio (Parma), "Sameness of Belief"

Alessandro Zucchi (Milano), "Truth-conditions, Underspecification, and Sign Language Discourse"

The commentators will be Ambròs Domingo, Fabio Del Prete, Chiara Panizza, Francesca Panzeri, Carlotta Pavese, Pablo Rychter, Ignacio Vicario, Paolo Valore.

For further information please contact Paolo Casalegno (Paolo.Casalegno@unimi.it)

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CONFERENCE ON MENTAL PROCESSES: INFERENCE AND REPRESENTATION

GENOA (Italy)

October 19-21 2005

The conference is organized by the Italian research program coordinated by Carlo Penco (Genoa) and by different Universities, as given in the program, who invited an expert from Europe to participate to the discussion. Web page:

<http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/con/mental05.htm>

Provisonal Program:

Concepts and natural language

Research group: University of Bologna (Paolo Leonardi)

Andrea Bianchi (University of Bologna)

Stephen Laurence (University of Sheffield)

Mind, Experience and the Scientific Image.

Research group: University of Firenze (Paolo Parrini)

Carlo Gabbani (University of Firenze)
Tim Crane (University College of London)

Concepts and Cognition

Research group: University of Genova (Carlo Penco)
Marcello Frixione (University of Salerno and Genova)
Elisabeth Pacherie (Centro Jean Nicod, Paris)

Normativity and cognitive role of senses

Research group: University of Padova (Enrico Martino and Pierdaniele Giaretta)
Elisabetta Sacchi (University of Padova)
Pascal Engel (Paris Sorbonne)

Action and Rationality

Research group: University of Roma3 (Rosaria Egidi)
Massimo Marraffa and Mario De Caro (Rome 3)
Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck College, London)

Intentionality naturalised

Research group: University of Siena (Sandro Nannini)
Sandro Nannini (University of Siena)
Achim Stephan, Universitat Osnabrueck

Truth in a world

Research group: University of Vercelli (Alberto Voltolini)
Diego Marconi (University of Torino)
Wolfgang Künne (Universität Hamburg)

Communication and context

Research group: University of Trieste (Marina Sbisà)
Paolo Bouquet (University of Trieste)
Francois Recanati (Centro Jean Nicod, Paris)

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SEMINAR OF THE JOINT DOCTORATE PROGRAM GENOA-BARCELONA:

GENOA (Italy)

(date to be decided):

Topics in the philosophy of Language and Mind

See also: <http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/events.htm>

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7TH EUROPEAN AGENT SYSTEMS SUMMER SCHOOL (EASSS05)

Utrecht, The Netherlands, 18 - 22 July 2005.

EASSS05 consists of a mixture of introductory and advanced courses delivered by internationally leading experts in the agent field, and it covers the full range of theoretical and practical aspects of agent-based computing. This year's EASSS offers more courses than ever, including practical programming sessions and a course with robots.

EASSS05 is open to anyone from research or industry, both AgentLink members and non-members alike. A registration fee will be charged to cover costs, but some support will also be available for PhD students.

There are several cheap connections from European cities to Utrecht, and EASSS05 will be held one week before AAMAS05!

Since we anticipate popular demand for this edition of EASSS, attendees are advised to book local accommodation as soon as possible.

For more information, a full program and registration:
<http://www.agentlink.org/happenings/easss/2005/index.html>

Wiebe van der Hoek
Coordinator of AgentLink III's
Student Integration Programme

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EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
13TH ANNUAL MEETING
LUND, SWEDEN, 11-14 AUGUST 2005

Invited Speakers:

- James Woodward (Caltech)
- Elizabeth Robinson (Keele)
- Brian O'Shaughnessy (Kings College London)
- Lawrence Barsalou (Emory)

Invited Symposia:

- ATTENTION convened by Ingar Brinck and Christian Balkenius, Lund
- CONDITIONALS convened by Kai von Fintel, MIT
- COLOURS convened by Justin Broackes, Brown
- EMOTION convened by Peter Goldie, Kings College London

Information about the Society be found at: www.eurospp.org.

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ATELIER LOGIQUE ET CHOIX RATIONNEL

Mardi 28 juin 2005

9h30-16h15

IHPST, Grande salle

Organisateur : Mikaël Cozic (IHPST)

Programme :

Logique et choix social

Président de séance : G. Sandu (IHPST, CNRS)

9h30-10h15 : M. Pauly (IRIT, CNRS): "Axiomatising Judgement aggregation procedures"

10h15-11h : Ph. Mongin (Laboratoire d'économétrie, CNRS & Ecole Polytechnique) : "Agrégation logique, agrégation probabiliste et choix social "

11h-11h15 : paus

11h15-12h : J-F. Laslier (Laboratoire d'économétrie, CNRS & Ecole Polytechnique) : "Une propriété de cohérence en théorie du choix"

Déjeuner

Logique, croyances et jeux

Président de séance : P. Egré (IHPST & IJN)

13h30-14h15 : J-M Tallon (CNRS-EUREQua) : "Croyances contradictoires et

communication" (en coll. avec J-C.Vergnaud et S.Zamir)
14h15-15h : B. Walliser (ENPC & EHESS) : "Révision des croyances et valeur
de l'information" (en coll. avec A.Billot et J-C. Vergnaud)
15h-15h30 : pause
15h30-16h15 : J. Lang (IRIT, CNRS & Université Paul Sabatier) : "Révision,
mise-à-jour, et croyances mutuelles"
IHPST-UMR 8590 (CNRS/ParisI/ENS)
13 rue du four, 75006 Paris
Tel : 01 43 54 60 36 Fax : 01 43 25 29 48
Site Web : <<http://www-ihpst.univ-paris1.fr/>>
<http://www-ihpst.univ-paris1.fr>

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SÉMINAIRE UCLA-IHPST

20-22 juin 2005

l'IHPST, grande salle

The Limits of Set Theory in the Formalization of Basic Mathematical Notions

Organisateur : G. Sandu (IHPST)

Programme :

20 juin

10h00 Introduction

10h15 Tony Anderson (UCLA), On paradoxes for possible languages as results

11h15 Sten Lindström (Umea U., Suède), On the semantics of logical and
metaphysical necessity

Après-midi

14h00 To be announced

15h00 David Kaplan (UCLA), On de re belief

16h30 François Rivenc (IHPST), Doing Without Proposition

21 juin

0h00 John Carriero, On cases of "synthetic apriori" in meditation II of
Descartes

11h00 T. Hyttinen (Helsinki), Sandu (IHPST), A Solution to Hardig's
Paradox

Après-midi

14h00 Joseph Almog (UCLA), Tony Martin (UCLA), What are numbers?

15h00 Terence Parsons (UCLA), On Frege's hierarchy
of senses

16h30 Frederike Moltmann (Stirling U., UK), Degrees of Objecthood

22 juin

10h00 Jacques Dubucs (IHPST), Intended Models

11h00 Denis Bonnay, Logicality and Invariance

Après-midi

14h00 Serge Bozon (IHPST), Set Theory and the Russell-Myhill Paradox

15h00 Sheldon SMITH, (UCLA), To be announced

16h30 Philippe de Rouilhan (IHPST), On Applying the Set-Theoretical
Concept of Validity to Set-Theoretical Arguments Themselves

IHPST-UMR 8590 (CNRS/ParisI/ENS)

13 rue du four, 75006 Paris

Tel : 01 43 54 60 36 Fax : 01 43 25 29 48

Site Web : <http://www-ihpst.univ-paris1.fr/>

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**FOURTH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SCIENTIFIC
REASONING AND APPLICATIONS (CMSRA-IV)**

Lisbon, Portugal

September 21-23, 2005

****EXTENDED**** Paper Deadlines:

Abstracts: May 24, 2005.

Full Papers: May 29, 2005.

Notification of Acceptance: June 30, 2005

Camera-ready Papers: July 15, 2005

A special issue of the Journal of Applied Logic will be devoted to the
best original papers presented in the workshop.

Web: <http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~greg/conf/CMSRA-IV.html>

Purpose

The CMSRA workshops are an international forum for researchers from the fields of
Logic & Decision, Knowledge Representation & Reasoning, Formal Epistemology,
Computational Logic and Cognitive Science to discuss recent work in computational
models of scientific reasoning.

Scope & Motivation

The CMSRA workshops are designed to promote research of high-level cognitive reasoning that addresses both the logico-philosophical issues surrounding high-level cognitive notions such as 'knowledge', 'belief' and 'rationality' among others, and also addresses the computational issues involved in constructing practical working models of such reasoning.

Research in this area is being driven by practical concerns and purely theoretical concerns. From a practical point of view, distributed computing and autonomous robotic agents offer two examples of research areas where there is increased interest in improving the capabilities of agents (or distributed processes) to reason about what each 'knows'. From a logico-philosophical point of view, the natural emphasis on formal semantics *and* syntax that computational modeling demands is generating new formal studies of concepts and relations that have been traditionally studied by philosophical logics, opening promising new lines of research.

Topics include:

1. Knowledge Representation & Formal Epistemology

KR&R Ontologies, Concept Formation

Theory Formation

Confirmation Theory, Evidence

Rational Acceptance, Belief

The Anchoring Problem, Perception

Experimental Design

2. Decision & Inference

Probability, Logic and Uncertainty Frameworks

Higher Order and Non-classical, Pure & Applied Logics

Computational Models of Reasoning:

-Analogical, Inductive, Abductive & Statistical Reasoning;

-Causal & Explanatory Reasoning;

-Hypothetical & Counterfactual Reasoning;

-Evidential & Defeasible Reasoning;

-Discovery, Investigation & Inquiry;

-Theory change, Belief Revision/Updates.

Learning

3. Distributed/Social Agents

Argumentation

Negotiation

Semantic web

Social Choice

Cooperation & Team Behavior

Distributed Scientific Reasoning

Computational Models of agent behavior in terms of:

- Multi-agent Modal epistemic logic;
- Update/Conditional Logics;
- Logic Programming;
- Game Theory.

4. Applications

New Information Technologies
 Computational Theories in the Sciences
 Probabilistic Proof Procedures
 Intelligent Data Mining, Agent-Based Scientific Discovery
 Models of Agreement
 Bioinformatic Knowledge Processing

Invited Speakers:

Teddy Seidenfeld, Carnegie Mellon University
 Wiebe van der Hoek, University of Liverpool

Program Chairs & Organizers

Luis Moniz Pereira (lmp@di.fct.unl.pt)
 Gregory Wheeler (greg@di.fct.unl.pt)

Program Committee

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 Jean-Yves Beziau (University of Neuchatel, Switzerland)
 Claudio Delrieux (Universidad Nacional del Sur, Argentina)
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 Gabriel Uzquiano (Ohio State University, USA)
 Gregory Wheeler (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal)
 Jon Williamson (London School of Economics, UK)

For more information:

Web: <http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~greg/conf/CMSRA-IV.html>

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**ECOLE THÉMATIQUE
ESPRIT – SCIENCE – METAPHYSIQUE**

Lieu : Ramatuelle (Côte d'Azur)

Date de début : samedi 10 sept 2005

Date de fin : vendredi 16 sept 2005

Site web : <http://espritmetaphysique.free.fr>

THEME : Approches et problèmes contemporains dans la réflexion philosophique sur la cognition et l'esprit, en particulier à la lumière de recherches récentes en philosophie des sciences et en métaphysique.

Objectifs de l'école

Pour faire avancer la compréhension philosophique de l'esprit et des phénomènes cognitifs, il est nécessaire de disposer d'un certain nombre d'outils conceptuels qui ont été développés en philosophie générale des sciences et en métaphysique, par exemple les concepts de propriété théorique, d'analyse fonctionnelle, d'explication réductrice, de disposition, ou encore d'émergence, tout en travaillant sur des domaines, comme la vision, l'action ou les émotions, où les recherches empiriques, en particulier en psychologie et neurophysiologie ont donné lieu à des avancées importantes. L'objectif de cette école est de permettre aux jeunes chercheurs de philosophie, mais aussi en sciences cognitives, en particulier en neurophysiologie et psychologie, de se familiariser avec les différentes traditions de réflexion sur l'esprit, ainsi qu'avec des concepts et modèles explicatifs développés en philosophie générale des sciences et en métaphysique analytique.

Un certain nombre de concepts clés de nature philosophique sont largement utilisés dans la formulation des questions et dans la construction des modèles explicatifs concernant la nature de l'esprit et des phénomènes mentaux : ce sont

notamment les concepts de loi de la nature, de causalité, de disposition et de pouvoir causal, de détermination, de réduction et d'explication réductrice, d'émergence, d'identité dans le temps (y compris d'identité personnelle), de relation interne et externe, de propriété, d'événement, de processus. Ces concepts font l'objet de recherches en philosophie générale des sciences et en métaphysique analytique ; mais les différentes conceptions qui y sont élaborées sont mal connues des chercheurs travaillant sur la nature des phénomènes cognitifs. Une telle réflexion sur les fondements conceptuels semble prometteuse pour suggérer de nouvelles pistes de réflexion dans des domaines tels que la modularité de la cognition, la nature et l'origine de la représentation de l'esprit d'autrui (la méta-représentation), le contenu conceptuel et non-conceptuel, la conscience et l'expérience qualitative (les *qualia*), l'intentionnalité, l'attention, l'intermodalité des représentations ou l'action. Réciproquement, les phénomènes cognitifs avec les problèmes riches et complexes qu'ils posent, constituent des cas particulièrement appropriés pour évaluer les approches élaborées dans le cadre plus général de la philosophie des sciences (causalité, lois des sciences spéciales et clauses « *ceteris paribus* », émergence) et de la métaphysique (dispositions et pouvoirs causaux, relations de détermination, propriétés et prédicats, réduction ontologique, survenance). Or, les philosophes des sciences sont en France traditionnellement formés à la réflexion sur les mathématiques, la physique et plus exceptionnellement la chimie et la biologie. En revanche, la réflexion sur les sciences cognitives, en particulier la psychologie et les sciences humaines, reste en philosophie des sciences encore trop marginale. L'école se propose de contribuer à combler cette lacune : la philosophie des sciences cognitives est un champ disciplinaire à développer qui devrait s'insérer entre la philosophie des sciences de la nature et la philosophie des « sciences humaines », ayant ses questions propres mais influençant les domaines plus traditionnels de la philosophie des sciences.

Il s'agit de promouvoir la réflexion philosophique sur l'esprit et les phénomènes cognitifs en tant que discipline charnière en étroite relation d'échanges à la fois avec les disciplines voisines de la philosophie (philosophie générale des sciences, métaphysique, mais aussi philosophie morale) avec les disciplines des sciences cognitives. La recherche philosophique sur la cognition ne peut être féconde que si elle se fait au contact de recherches scientifiques : par exemple, ce n'est qu'en étudiant des recherches précises en neurosciences cognitives que l'on peut espérer développer une conception adéquate de l'explication réductrice.

L'école ne pourra pas remplacer une formation complète dans tous ces domaines, mais elle pourra transmettre aux participants des informations qui les aident à orienter leur recherche dans une direction fructueuse. L'école permettra de mettre en commun des connaissances de participants venus d'horizons divers quoique tous travaillant sur un sujet commun, l'esprit ou la cognition, chacun étant tour à tour expert et novice.

Public visé

- prioritairement :

jeunes chercheurs, enseignants-chercheurs, doctorants et post-doctorants en philosophie de l'esprit, philosophie des sciences et métaphysique.

- secondairement :

chercheurs et enseignants-chercheurs dans ces domaines ; doctorants, post-doctorants, jeunes chercheurs et enseignants-chercheurs en sciences cognitives, en particulier en neurophysiologie et psychologie, ainsi que dans d'autres domaines des sciences humaines et sociales et des sciences de la nature, ingénieurs, enseignants du secondaire, professionnels.

Enseignements

Il y aura 7 cours obligatoires. Par ailleurs, chaque candidat choisira 2 ateliers parmi 4 proposés.

Les enseignants mettront des documents à la disposition des participants sélectionnés (à télécharger à partir du site web de l'école), dès mi-mai, afin de préparer le travail à l'école.

Attention, un cours (par Tim Crane) sera dispensé en anglais.

Module	Intervenants	Forme
Métaphysique : dispositions, lois de la nature	Claudine Tiercelin, professeur (Université Paris XII)	Cours
La psychologie évolutionniste : hier, aujourd'hui et demain	Luc Faucher et Pierre Poirier, professeurs (Université du Québec à Montréal)	Cours
The metaphysics of intentionality	Tim Crane, professeur (University College London)	Cours
Contextualisme et cognition située	Jérôme Dokic, directeur d'études (EHESS et CNRS)	Cours
Questions de réduction entre philosophie des sciences et philosophie de l'esprit	Anouk Barberousse, chargée de recherches (CNRS)	Cours
Grammaire, langage et philosophie de l'esprit	Jean-Pierre Cometti, professeur (Université de	Cours

	Provence)	
La cognition motrice	Marc Jeannerod, professeur (Université Lyon I, et CNRS)	Cours
Conscience et réflexivité	Joëlle Proust, directeur de recherches (CNRS)	atelier
Rationalité et raisons	Pascal Engel, professeur (Université Paris IV et CNRS)	atelier
La dynamique des intentions	Elisabeth Pacherie, directeur de recherches (CNRS)	Atelier
Qualia et physicalisme	Pascal Ludwig, maître de conférences (Université Paris IV et CNRS)	Atelier

Veillez trouver les DESCRIPTIFS DES COURS ET ATELIERS sur le site web de l'école :

<http://espritmetaphysique.free.fr>

CONDITIONS FINANCIERES

Les participants qui seront admis n'auront à payer ni droits d'inscription ni frais de séjour, ces frais étant pris en charge par l'école.

En revanche, les frais de transport jusqu'à Ramatuelle restent à leur charge. Les participants sont invités à demander le remboursement de leur frais de transport à leur tutelle, leur laboratoire de rattachement ou, le cas échéant, leur école doctorale. Les personnels du CNRS peuvent demander la prise en charge de leur transport au service formation permanente de leur délégation d'origine sur présentation de leur convocation.

DOSSIERS DE CANDIDATURE

Les candidats doivent fournir les informations suivantes :

Nom, adresse, courrier électronique, téléphone, nationalité, statut, affiliation institutionnelle ou laboratoire de rattachement, CV

Lettre de motivation

Ateliers choisis :

Conscience et réflexivité (Proust) ou **La dynamique des intentions** (Pacherie) ;

Rationalité et raisons (Engel) ou **Qualia et physicalisme** (Ludwig)

Pour les doctorants :

Avis de leur directeur de thèse
Résumé de la thèse en cours

Dossier à envoyer avant le 25 mai à :

Max Kistler
Institut Jean Nicod
1bis av Lowendal
75007 Paris
France
kistler@free.fr

Merci de préciser « ESM candidature » dans l'intitulé de votre e-mail.

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FORMAL PHILOSOPHY

<http://www.formalphilosophy.com>

Founded and edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and John Symons / ISBN 1904987176 / Available in December 2005, online and book format

Formal methods play a significant role in philosophical and scientific thinking. The development of novel formal theories and techniques has often sparked the formulation of, and the solution to, central philosophical and scientific problems. Formal insights have sharpened, radicalized and extended insights and ideas, which without use of formal representations would not have seen the light of day. Formal methods serve as fulcrums in philosophy and science, although formal means per se may be technical in nature, they raise many general philosophical questions. What is the range of applications of formal methods? Can one advance universal principles for determining whether a given problem at hand can be solved using formal methods? Etc.

Formal Philosophy is a collection of short interviews with some of the most influential and prominent scholars in formal philosophy. We hear their views on formal philosophy, its aim, scope, prospect and future direction and how your work fits in these regards.

Formal Philosophy conveys the importance of formal philosophy and serves as a resource for prospective students interested in the application and scope of formal methods in philosophy.

Interviewees

- Johan van Benthem
- Brian F. Chellas
- Anne Fagot-Largeault
- Solomon Feferman
- Melvin Fitting
- Bas van Fraassen
- Dagfinn Føllesdal
- Haim Gaifman
- Clark Glymour
- Adolf Grünbaum
- Susan Haack
- Sven Ove Hansson
- Jaakko Hintikka
- Isaac Levi
- H. Jerome Keisler
- Ruth Barcan Marcus
- Rohit Parikh
- Jeff Paris
- Gabriel Sandu
- Krister Segerberg
- Wolfgang Spohn
- Robert Stalnaker
- Patrick Suppes
- Timothy Williamson

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JAAKKO HINTIKKA: KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF THE TWO NOTIONS.

Reissue edition, Prepared by Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons, King's College Publications, May 2005, ISBN: 1904987087

In 1962 Jaakko Hintikka published *Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions* with Cornell University Press. Almost every paper or a book on epistemic and doxastic logic that has appeared since then has referred to this seminal work. Although many philosophers working in logic, epistemology, game-theory, economics, computer science and linguistics mention the book, it is very likely that most have never literally had their hands on it, much less owned a copy. After a fourth printing in 1969, *Knowledge and*

Belief went out of print and as many of us have found to our dismay, it has become increasingly difficult to find used copies at our local shops or online. It is our pleasure to provide the interdisciplinary community with this reprint edition of Knowledge and Belief.

Knowledge and Belief is a classic on which a generation - my generation - of epistemologists cut their teeth. This reissue is welcome. It will provide something for the next generation to chew on.
Fred Dretske, Duke University

It is wonderful to see this classic being reissued after so many years out of print. It was extremely influential in its day; its influence continues to this day, through the impact of epistemic logic in fields as diverse distributed computing, artificial intelligence, and game theory. This reissue should make it possible for a new generation of researchers to appreciate Hintikka's groundbreaking work.
Joseph Halpern, Cornell University

Available at AMAZON

<http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1904987087/qid%3D1117465677/026-7894271-0092408>

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PHINEWS

volume 8 is due in October 2005. Deadline for submissions is September 1, 2005.

PHINEWS is published by PHILOG: <http://www.philog.ruc.dk>
and Springer: <http://www.springeronline.com>

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FINE PHILOSOPHY – THE PHILOSOPHY OF KIT FINE

Faculté de Lettres, Université de Genève, Switzerland

Scientific Committee: Kevin Mulligan (Geneva), Michael Esfeld (Lausanne), Gianfranco Soldati (Fribourg).

Invited Speakers: Paul Horwich (New York), Philip Percival (Glasgow), Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford), Fabrice Correia (Tarragona), Bob Hale (Glasgow), Alan Weir (Belfast), Manuel García-Carpintero (Barcelona).

The papers presented concern different topics in the philosophy of Kit Fine: realism, essence, knowledge of mathematical objects, and supervenience.

In “The Question of Realism” Fine distinguishes between *nonfactual* and *factual* propositions, the latter being in turn divided into *real* and *unreal* propositions: an unreal proposition is grounded in real propositions, while a real proposition is ungrounded. The notion of *ground* is defined as follows:

Given the propositions p, p_1, p_2, \dots , we say that p_1, p_2, \dots (*collectively*) *ground* p and that each of them *partly grounds* p iff being the case that p consists in nothing more than being the case that p_1, p_2, \dots .

By means of a counter-example, Horwich has challenged the following thesis held by Fine: if p is factual and C is an *essential* constituent of p (i.e. such that a substitution for C in p changes its truth-value), then any *ground* of p contains C . Horwich’s counter-example is given by the proposition $\langle \text{‘f’ refers to f-ness} \rangle$, which is factual although not any ground of it contains the essential constituent f-ness. Percival instead has argued that propositions grounded in real propositions are still real; so, ‘factual’ and ‘real’ would be co-extensional.

The assimilation of essence to modality is disputed by Fine in his article “Essence and Modality”: the fact that necessarily, an object has a certain property if it exists does not entail that it has essentially that property.

According to Correia, within a Priorian modal framework the assimilation of essence to modality could be restored. Wedgwood instead criticizes the thesis, defended by Fine, according to which the metaphysically necessary propositions *follow* from the essence of things and he suggests an amendment to this thesis: his view is that essentialist truths *help explain* the necessary truths.

In “Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects” Fine defends a new form of postulationism, called *procedural*, according to which what are postulated are not, as in the classical view, propositions true in a given mathematical domain but procedures for

the construction of that domain. From the new postulates (by a special *logic of postulation*) the axioms for the domain are derived.

Different objections are offered by Hale and Weir: Hale doubts that procedural postulationism introduces a new and legitimate form of definition; Weir instead explores the problematic possibility of introducing *empirical* predicates into postulates and he stresses how postulationism only makes sense given a radical anti-realism about mathematics which however cannot accommodate infinite domains.

Carpintero's paper concerns an old idea of Fine's, the supervaluational treatment of vagueness, which – Williamson and Wright argue – involves an implicit surrender of the T-scheme. According to Carpintero, this is not a serious problem since independently motivated philosophical distinctions support such a surrender.

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**THE 1ST OXFORD-BUDAPEST CONFERENCE
CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST
APRIL 28-30, 2005**

Organizers: **Zsolt Novák** and **András Simonyi**

Topic: ***Truth, Reference, and Realism***

Conference opening talk: **Yehuda Elkana** (CEU President and Rector)

Ferenc Huoranszki (CEU)

Responsibility, Reason and Weakness of the Will

Comments: **Greg Bognár** (CEU)

Daniel Isaacson (Oxford University)

Truth, Reference and Realism in Set Theory

Comments: **Ferenc Csaba** (Eötvös University)

Nenad Miscevic (CEU)

Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth

Comments: **Zsófia Zvolenszky** (NYU & ELTE)

Howard M. Robinson (CEU)

Abstract Objects and Intellect

Comments: **István Bodnár** (CEU)

Ian Rumfitt (Oxford University)

Logic as a Norm

Comments: **András Máté** (Eötvös University)

Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford University)

The Refutation of Expressivism

Comments: **Márta Újvári** (Corvinus University)

Timothy Williamson (Oxford University)

Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality

Comments: **Katalin Farkas** (CEU)

The conference ended with a round-table for student discussion.

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THE 3RD BUCHAREST COLLOQUIUM IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy, University of Bucharest

New Europe College, Bucharest

May 28-29, 2005

Organizer: **Mircea Dumitru**

Topic: *Mind, Language, and Knowledge*

Simon Blackburn (University of Cambridge)

Truth for Postmodernists

Radu Bogdan (Tulane University)

Inside Loops: The Development of Self-Ascriptions

Daniel Dennett (Tufts University)

Philosophers, Zombies, and Feelings: The Illusions of 'First-Person' Approaches to Consciousness

Mircea Dumitru (University of Bucharest)

Explaining Phenomenal Consciousness: Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?

Pascal Engel (Université Paris-IV Sorbonne)

Think Twice: Practical vs. Theoretical Reason

Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University)

Simulation-Based Mindreading

Pierre Jacob (CNRS & Institut Jean Nicod)

The scope and Limits of Motor Theories of Visual Perception

Joelle Proust (CNRS & Institut Jean Nicod)
Metacognition and Self-Awareness
Gheorghe Stefanov (University of Bucharest)
Propositional Attitudes as Speech Acts

SHORT HISTORY

The 2nd Bucharest Colloquium in Analytic Philosophy (May 2003)

Topic: *Philosophy of Mind and Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science*
Speakers: **Radu Bogdan** (Tulane University), **Fred Dretske** (Duke University), **Radu Dudau** ('Alexandru I. Cuza' University, Iasi), **Mircea Dumitru** (University of Bucharest), **Dumitru Gheorghiu** ('Titu Maiorescu' University, Bucharest), **Keith Lehrer** (University of Arizona), **Ruth Millikan** (University of Connecticut), **Radu-Mihail Solcan** (University of Bucharest), **Dan Sperber** (CNRS & Institut Jean Nicod), **Laurentiu Staicu** (University of Bucharest), **Gheorghe Stefanov** (University of Bucharest).

The 1st Bucharest Colloquium in Analytic Philosophy (May 2002)

Topic: *Contemporary Issues in Analytic Philosophy*
Speakers: **Michael Devitt** (City University of New York), **Mircea Dumitru** (University of Bucharest), **Hartry Field** (New York University), **Peter Gardenfors** (Lund University), **Adrian-Paul Iliescu** (University of Bucharest), **Adrian Miroiu** (SNSPA Bucharest), **Thomas Nagel** (New York University), **Ilie Parvu** (University of Bucharest), **Radu-Mihail Solcan** (University of Bucharest), **Stephen Stich** (Rutgers University), **Gheorge Stefanov** (University of Bucharest).

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CONFERENCE ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER, DUBROVNIK

May 16-21, 2005

Organizers: **George Pappas** and **Nenad Miscevic**

Louise Antony (Ohio State University)

Is 'Non-Conceptual Content' Content?

Boran Bercic (University of Rijeka)

Introspection, Explanatory Gap, and the Informativity of Explanation

Alex Byrne (MIT)

Either/Or: Disjunctivism for Dummies

Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford University)

Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy

David Henderson (University of Memphis)

Transglobal Reliabilism

Noa Latham (University of Calgary)

Fundamental Laws, Physical Properties, and Causation

Janet Levin (University of Southern California)

Molyneux's Question and the Individuation of Perceptual Concepts

Joe Levine (Ohio State University)

Secondary Qualities and Experience

Ausonio Marras (University of Western Ontario)

On the Reducibility of Consciousness

Sarah McGrath (College of the Holy Cross)

Moral Knowledge and Moral Disagreement

Brian McLaughlin (Rutgers University)

Why Physicalists Should Be A Posteriori Physicalists

Bill Melanson (Ohio State University)

Lessons from The Open Sea

Nenad Miscevic (University of Maribor & CEU)

Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth

George Pappas (Ohio State University)

Access Internalism

Zusana Parusnikova (Czech Academy)

Ratio Negativa: The Popperian Challenge

Laurie Paul (University of Arizona)

The Metaphysics of Multiple Realization

Matjaz Potrc (University of Ljubljana)

Refined Common-Sense Metaphysical Realism

Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija (University of Rijeka)

Trusty and Testimony

Georges Rey (Maryland University)

Intentional Inexistents in Cognitive Science

Bill Roche (Ohio State University)

Can A Coherentist Be An Externalist?

Bruce Russell (Wayne State University)

Why Not Evidentialism?

Josh Smith (Ohio State University)

Access Internalism, Mentalism, and Having Evidence

Michael Watkins (Auburn University)

Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum

Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford University)

How We Know What Ought to Be?

STUDENT SECTION

Martina Fürst (University of Graz)

Is Mental Content Phenomenally Constituted? An Analysis of Intentional States

Guido Melcior (University of Graz)

Belief, Truth, and Justification: An Argumentation for A Total Skepticism

Lucian Zagan (CEU)

Deflationary Truth and Nonfactualism

Dan Zeman (CEU)

Relativism and Alethic Pluralism

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2005 AXEL HÄGERSTRÖM LECTURES

May 17-20

The Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden.

The annual Axel Hägerström lectures were delivered by Professor John McDowell, University of Pittsburgh. The topic of the lectures was *Mind in Action*

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2005 PUFENDORF LECTURES

May 17-20

The Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden.

The annual Pufendorf lectures were delivered by Philip Pettit, William Nelson Cromwell Professor, Princeton University. He gave four lectures on the topic "Democracy in three dimensions". For more information, visit <http://www.fil.lu.se/>.

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EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE MIND

Workshop on the philosophy of Alvin I. Goldman.

Wed. 25 May, Department of Philosophy, Lund University.

Organizer and moderator: Erik J. Olsson

Alvin I. Goldman "Justification Ascriptions, Epistemic Communities, Reliabilism, and the Internalism/Externalism Dispute".

Erik J Olsson "Goldman on the Nature and Value of Knowledge"

Ingar Brink "On Mirror Neurons for, Mindreading and Social Action".

Wlodek Rabinowicz "Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions: An Epistemic Perspective

Annika Wallin "Simulation or Theory? Preference Prediction in the Field.

Vincent F. Hendricks Mainstream and Formal Notions of Reliability".